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I. OVERVIEW-THE CONCEPT OF DELAY
"When a man sits with a pretty girl for an hour, it seems like a
minute. But let him sit on a hot stove for a minute-and it's
longer than any hour. That's relativity."'
-Albert Einstein
N PRIVATE international air law, delay is a compensable dam-
age, but the method of defining this term has been controver-
I E.g., Albert Einstein Quotes, NOTABLE-QUOTES.COM, http://www.notable-quotes.
com/e/einstein-albert.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
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sial from the beginning of commercial air transportation. This
is largely because delay is a highly relative and subjective con-
cept depending on many factors, including culture and circum-
stance. Early aviation scholars emphasized that time is a factor
that should always be taken into account when dealing with
commercial aviation.2
For example, if a passenger is comfortably watching an excit-
ing football match in an airport lounge and is informed that his
flight is delayed for an hour, it will probably not matter much to
him. On the contrary, if a passenger finds that his flight will be
delayed for an hour while traveling home after an exhausting
business trip, it might be much more stressful. The objective
temporal delay is identical in both cases, but the extent of the
inconvenience-or damage-each passenger faces is significantly
different. Einstein's theory of relativity might explain how pas-
sengers perceive delays at airports and why there is wisdom in
paying disparate compensation to passengers based on their par-
ticular damages.
In 2011, approximately 2.8 billion people flew on 38 million
flights (30 million by jet and 8 million by turboprop), and the
"2011 global accident rate (measured in hull losses per million
flights of Western-built jets) was 0.37," which is equivalent to
"one accident every 2.7 million flights. ' Despite the fact that
the definition of "delay" and the period of time that constitutes
delay varies by air carrier or airport, such that it is practically
impossible to assess global on-time rates, there is no doubt that
air carriers' on-time performance has greatly improved since
commercial air transportation began. For example, the passen-
ger aircraft on-time performance rate departing from Seoul In-
cheon International Airport was 92.2% in 2009, where a flight is
considered delayed when it departs fifteen or more minutes
later than the scheduled departure time.4 Major airline on-time
arrival performance in U.S. airports was 79.49% in 2009, where
2 See Enrique Mapelli Y Lopez, Air Carriers Liability in Cases of Delay, 1 AIR &
SPACE L. 109, 109 (1976); SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERO-
NAUTICAL LAw 54-55 (Robert C. Horner & Didier Legrez trans.) (1975) [herein-
after SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE].
3 Press Release, Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n, Global Accident Rate Reaches New
Low - Regional Challenges Remain (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://
www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/pages/2012-03-06-01 .aspx.
4 U.S. Research & Innovative Tech. Admin., Airline On-Time Statistics and Delay
Causes, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/OT-delay/
OTdelaycausel.asp?pn=l.
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a flight is considered delayed when it arrives fifteen or more
minutes later than the scheduled arrival.5
Generally, causes of delays are related to one or more of the
following factors: weather, aircraft maintenance, aircraft con-
nections, air traffic congestion, or security. Air carriers must
deal with these tangible and intangible obstacles every day. Nev-
ertheless, air carrier on-time performance has improved for
three main reasons. First, the development of aviation technol-
ogy has improved on-time performance. Aircraft technology
and air traffic control technology have enabled air carriers to
operate in the kinds of weather conditions that routinely made
some flights impossible in the past. Second, air carriers' desire
to earn profits has also helped decrease the number of flight
delays. Flight scheduling "involves providing aircraft departures
to cities at times (supply) to which and when consumers want to
fly (demand), in order to convince passengers to exchange eco-
nomic resources (revenue) for those benefits."' Since flight
scheduling can be impeded by unexpected circumstances caus-
ing flight delay, air carriers do their best to reduce dwell time-
the period of time between aircraft arrival and departure-to
maximize their revenues. Third, since the advent of modern,
conventional air carrier liability law, air carriers on international
flights have become presumptively liable in cases of delay.
Therefore, air carriers take positive steps in operations not to
attract liability for the damage occasioned by delays. Despite
these observations, the vicissitudes and contingencies of life en-
sure it is highly probable that delays will remain unavoidable in
air transportation. Accordingly, defining and treating an air car-
rier's liability for passenger delay are important tasks.
This article will examine two influential international and re-
gional legal regimes which seek to create certainty around pas-
sengers' expectations of compensation when they have suffered
a delay. While this term has been the subject of much passenger
and consumer rights legislation, it is a term that was more elo-
quently captured in the words of Einstein, above, than in the air
law instruments which have arisen to shield air passengers from
the negative impacts of delay. We hope to present a plea that a
comprehensive review or, indeed, repeal, of certain regional
regulations must be accomplished to ensure that passenger
5 Id.
6 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & LAURENCE E. GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT: STRAT-
EGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 249 (1997).
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compensation for delays returns to the pathway originally set by
the international community in the noble pursuit of uniformity.
II. DELAY FROM THE WARSAW CONVENTION TO THE
MONTREAL CONVENTION
A. DELAY IN THE WARSAW CONVENTION (1929)
Prior to the Second International Conference on Private Aer-
onautical Law in 1929 (Conference), which adopted the Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air 7 (Warsaw Convention), the
Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Ariens
(CITEJA) produced a draft convention concerning air transport
documents and the liability of the carrier in international car-
riage by aircraft.8 During the third session of the Conference
held on October 6, 1929, Mr. Henri De Vos, the reporter to the
Conference, acknowledged that the liability of the carrier in the
case of delay had been made the object of numerous objections
on the part of air carriers in general.9 However, it was CITEJA's
belief that a principle of liability due to delay should be estab-
lished.1" Accordingly, CITEJA introduced the following princi-
ple in Article 21 (c) of the draft convention: "the carrier shall be
liable for damage sustained during carriage in the case of delay
suffered by a traveler, goods, or baggage.""
There were interesting proposals from some states, namely
Poland, Great Britain, and Germany, whose delegates suggested
amendments to the original wording of Article 21(c). Poland's
delegate expressed concerns about liability for delay of travelers
because it would open the door to innumerable trials and diffi-
culties of proof.' 2 Accordingly, he suggested eliminating the
words "by a traveller."13 Great Britain's delegate proposed that
air carriers should be allowed to include a delay provision in the
conditions of contract, stipulating that air carriers do not guar-
7 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11,
reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
8 SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 13.
9 Id. at 54-55.
10 See id. at 253 ("The principle of liability in the case of delay was retained in
order that the carrier not be free to hand over the goods or to have the traveler
arrive according to the carrier's own pleasure.").
11 CITEJA, Draft Convention, Article 21(c).
12 SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 56-57.
13 Id.
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antee on-time operation. 4 Sir Alfred Dennis proposed adding
words to the effect of "except as otherwise agreed" to Article
21 (c).15 The majority of delegates shared the view that speed is
a basic and specific characteristic of air transportation, and de-
lay is a source of damage to the interests of passengers.' 6 Ulti-
mately, the Conference adopted a principle of liability due to
delay in Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention, which simply stip-
ulates that "[t]he carrier is liable for damage occasioned by de-
lay in the carriage by air of passengers, luggage or goods."' 7
Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention was criticized for lack of
clarity.'" Not every delay can be the responsibility of air carriers,
so more explanation-i.e., definition-would have further re-
fined it. Consequently, two fundamental questions about Article
19 remain unanswered: which factors constitute delay, and what
length must that period of delay be? As to the first question,
Professor Diederiks-Verschoor suggested the following consider-
ations when determining liability for delay:
(1) the existence of the material fact of the delay;
(2) the fact or circumstance that the delay is produced in the
course of the air transportation; and
(3) that the damage is a direct effect of the delay.'"
As to the second question, Mr. Henri De Vos, on behalf of
CITEJA, stated that the carrier must fulfill its obligations within
a reasonable period and that defining "reasonable period" is a
question of appreciation of the facts to be resolved by ajudge, as
no formula can determine such a period.2 °
The question of how to define compensable delay is assisted
by Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention.2' In fact, Article 19
should be read together with Article 20, which states that a car-
14 Id. at 55.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 56-57.
'7 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 19.
18 See I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 82 (7th
rev. ed. 2001).
19 Id.
20 SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 253.
21 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 20 ("The carrier is not liable if he
proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures. In the
carriage of goods and luggage the carrier is not liable if he proves that the dam-
age was occasioned by negligent pilotage or negligence in the handling of the
aircraft or in navigation and that, in all other respects, he and his agent have
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage.").
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rier can relieve itself from liability if it proves it took "all neces-
sary measures" to avoid the loss or it was impossible for it to do
SO. 2 2 The losses referred to are passenger death or bodily injury,
damage to or loss of any registered luggage or goods, and "dam-
age occasioned by delay," which Articles 17, 18, and 19 of the
Warsaw Convention stipulate, respectively.23 Courts have inter-
preted the phrase "all necessary measures" in Article 20 to mean
"all reasonable measures. '24 Determining whether "all reasona-
ble measures" were taken to avoid the delay is closely inter-
twined with an assessment of whether the causes of delay and the
period of delay were reasonable.25
Confusingly, the Warsaw Convention did not discuss a mone-
tary limit on liability for damage caused by passenger delay. Ar-
ticle 22 provides limits of liabilities for other types of damage:
125,000 francs for the death or bodily injury by a passenger; 250
francs per kilogram for damage to or loss of any registered lug-
gage or goods; and 5,000 francs for damage to any carry-on
item. 26 A Swiss delegate in the Conference suggested that the
limit of liability for passenger delay should be 2,500 francs.27
While there were different views on how to interpret the limit of
liability, it was common knowledge that the lack of reference to
monetary limits did not mean that air carriers must face unlim-
ited liability in the case of delay.28
B. DELAY IN THE MONTREAL CONVENTION (1999)
Neither the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air
(Hague Protocol) nor its own subsequent protocol (Guatemala
City Protocol) amended Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention,29
22 Id.
23 Id. arts. 17-19.
24 E.g., Lee v. American Airlines, Inc., No. CTVA3: 01-CV-1179-P, 2004 WL
2624647, at * 1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2004).
25 See cases discussed infra Part III.
26 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 22.
27 SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 320.
28 Id. at 88-89.
29 See generally Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Oc-
tober 1929, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter
Hague Protocol]; Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Oc-
tober 1929, as Amended By The Protocol Done At The Hague on 28 September
1955, opened for signature Mar. 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 613, ICAO Doc. 8932 [hereinaf-
ter Guatemala City Protocol].
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but the Guatemala City Protocol amended Article 20 by specify-
ing a defense mechanism in cases of delays.3 0 Although Article
20 of the Warsaw Convention provided the "all necessary mea-
sures" defense, it was not confined to delay."
Ultimately, Article 19 of the new Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Mon-
treal Convention), provided:
The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the car-
riage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo. Nevertheless, the
carrier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if it
proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that
could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for it or them to take such measures. 2
The first sentence of Article 19 of the Montreal Convention is
the same as Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention, except it
changes the words "luggage or goods" to "baggage or cargo. 3
3
The more substantial change is that the Montreal Convention
amended the second sentence of Article 19 from "taken all nec-
essary measures to avoid the damage" to "took all measures that
could reasonably be required to avoid the damage," while leav-
ing the words "it was impossible for it or them to take such mea-
sures" unchanged. 4 On its face, "all necessary measures"
appeared "to be a more exacting standard than 'all measures
that [could] reasonably be required.' "35
There was an attempt to specify the meaning of "delay" in
preparation for the Montreal Convention. The 30th Legal Com-
mittee proposed defining delay as "the failure to carry passen-
gers or deliver baggage or cargo to their immediate or final
destination within the time which it would be reasonable to ex-
3o Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 29, art. 10.
31 Id. art. 20 ("In the carriage of passenger and baggage the carrier shall not be
liable for damage occasioned by delay if he proves that he and his servants and
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was im-
possible for them to take such measures. In the carriage of cargo the carrier shall
not be liable for damage resulting from destruction, loss, damage or delay if he
proves that he and his servants and agents have taken all necessary measures to
avoid the damage or that it was impossible for them to take such measures.").
32 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air art. 19, opened for signature May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter
Montreal Convention].
33 Compare id., with Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 19.
34 Compare Montreal Convention, supra note 32, art. 19, with Warsaw Conven-
tion, supra note 7, art. 20.
35 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & MICHAEL MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER LIA-
BILrrY: THE MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1999 177 (2005).
AIR CARRIER LIABILITY FOR DELAY
pect from a diligent carrier to do so, having regard to all the
relevant circumstances. 3 6
However, the Special Group on the Modernization and Con-
solidation of the "Warsaw System," which was established by the
152nd Session of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) Council, subsequently deleted the above paragraph."
The reasons for the deletion were discussed in the International
Conference on Air Law in Montreal. The President of the con-
ference indicated that the "Special Group" took a pragmatic ap-
proach in deciding to leave the term "delay" without a definition
due to the difficulty of finding precise language that would
cover all circumstances which could be characterized as "de-
lay." The Chairman of the Drafting Committee added that a
considerable amount of work had been undertaken in order to
determine whether the term "delay" could be given a definitive
definition; however, delays varied from case to case and circum-
stance to circumstance, so he maintained that it would be an
impossible task to develop a short, precise definition. 9 He also
commented that the general wording of draft Article 18-which
became Article 19 in the final version-was intended to provide
sufficient signposts.40 Thus, despite both the Warsaw Conven-
tion's and the Montreal Convention's textual explication that
air carriers are liable for damage occasioned by delay, a defini-
tion of "delay" did not appear in the conventions. As a result,
the interpretation of delay is determined by judges in both civil
and common law jurisdictions.
Unlike the Warsaw Convention, Article 22 of the Montreal
Convention specifically provides a monetary limit for compensa-
tion.4' As of December 30, 2009, the original liability limit for
delay-4,150 Special Drawing Rights (SDR)-had been in-
creased to 4,694 SDR.4 2
36 Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], at 83, ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2 [hereinafter
ICAO Doc.].
37 The Special Group meeting convened from April 14-18, 1998.
38 ICAO Doc., supra note 36, at 83.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Montreal Convention, supra note 32, art. 22 ("In the case of damage caused
by delay as specified in Article 19 in the carriage of persons, the liability of the
carrier for each passenger is limited to 4,150 Special Drawing Rights.").
42 Press Release, Gov't of Hong Kong, Revision of Limits of Liability in Mon-
treal Convention to Be Gazetted (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.info.
gov.hk/gia/general/200912/09/P200912090258.htm. This reflected a 13.1% in-
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C. UNIFORMITY IN THE CONVENTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
OF DELAY
Uniformity was, and remains, a major objective in public and
private international air law." The Warsaw Convention recog-
nized the trans-jurisdictional potential for aviation and, accord-
ingly, sought to create a uniform and equivalent cross-boundary
legal regime. 44 In an inherently international industry like com-
mercial aviation, both suppliers and consumers benefit from the
harmonization of legal relations. Continuing in this vein, the
Montreal Convention aims to achieve uniformity and certainty
for the passenger and carrier alike: it combines a core set of
liability rules for passenger death or injury with other events,
such as loss or damage to baggage and delay, to regulate this
major aspect of contracts for air carriage in a standardized way.45
Preserving uniformity in the application of liability requires
exclusivity of operation for any remedies provided. Thus, Arti-
cle 29 of the Montreal Convention provides that claims for com-
pensation by passengers cannot be brought other than in
accordance with the terms of the Montreal Convention:
In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for
damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or
in contract or tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to
the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this
Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the
persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their re-
spective rights. In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any
other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable.46
Accordingly, Article 29 seeks to ensure that the Montreal Con-
vention remains the exclusive source for a cause of action for
compensatory damages arising under contracts for international
air carriage. A significant body of case law indicates that other
remedies, such as those which arise under domestic laws, are
excluded or "pre-empted."47 Thus, a claimant cannot make
crease for inflation, pursuant to authority under the Montreal Convention. Id.;
Montreal Convention, supra note 32, art. 24, para. 2.
43 See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAw 2 (2008).
44 DEMPSEY & MILDE, supra note 35, at 11.
45 See Montreal Convention, supra note 32, arts. 17-37.
46 Id. art. 29.
47 See, e.g., Ugaz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360-61 (S.D. Fla.
2008); Walton v. Mytravel Can. Holdings, Inc., 280 Sask. R.1, paras. 31-32 (2006).
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analogous or concurrent claims under domestic contract or tort
law to bypass the rules and limits of the Montreal Convention.4
The British House of Lords in Sidhu v. British Airways held that
the Montreal Convention's predecessor, the Warsaw Conven-
tion, which contained a relevantly similar article, excluded other
contractual or tortious claims for damages.4 9 The court noted
"in all questions . . . , it is the provisions of the Convention
which apply and ... the passenger does not have access to any
other remedies, whether under the common law or otherwise,
which may be available within the particular country where he
chooses to raise his action. '"50
Lord Hope summed up the pragmatic effect of the exclusivity
of the Montreal Convention when he held that air carriers "[do]
not need to make provision for the risk of being subjected to
such remedies, because the whole matter is regulated by the
Convention. 15 1 The Supreme Court of the United States took a
similar approach in El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng.52 Justice Gins-
burg approved Sidhu and held that the Montreal Convention
"precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for... dam-
ages under local law when her claim does not satisfy the condi-
tions for liability under the Convention. '5 3 These propositions
are now considered settled.54
Unfortunately, this well-reasoned and intuitively satisfying
construction has not been followed in other continental jurisdic-
tions and has, in fact, battled with conflicting regional legisla-
tion that seeks to give effect to consumer protection policies.
This misalignment of public policy and legislation, which argua-
bly runs contrary to the existing conventional framework, is ex-
amined below. It will be argued that this ardor for consumer
protection has consequently sidelined the prime objective of in-
ternational uniformity, even in the context of factual and juris-
prudential evidence of its failing.
48 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999); Sidhu v. British
Airways, Plc., [1997] A.C. 430 (H.L.) 453-54 (appeal taken from Scot.).
49 Sidhu, [1997] A.C. at 453-54.
50 Id. at 447 (Lord Hope).
51 Id.
52 El Al Israel Airlines, 525 U.S. at 156.
53 Id. at 175-76.
54 See Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 385 (2d Cir. 2004); King v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 356-57 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Deep Vein Throm-
bosis & Air Travel Group Litig. [2005] UKHL 72, [2006] 1 A.C. 495 (H.L.) 500
(appeal taken from Eng.); DEMPSEY & MILDE, supra note 35, at 14.
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III. SIGNIFICANT JURISPRUDENCE INTERPRETING THE
CONVENTIONAL DELAY PROVISIONS
The following case law provides an overview of the kinds of
reasoning courts have used in disputes interpreting or applying
Article 19. A notable theme is the acceptance of the Montreal
Convention as an exclusive remedy for passengers-to the ex-
tent of their proven damages-as long as those damages are not
too remote-in particular, not the kinds of damages which are
implicitly excluded under the Montreal Convention, such as
mental anguish.
A. SELECTED CASE LAW ON DELAY
In Lee v. American Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff and twenty others
brought suit under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention seeking
"to recover damages for delay, inconvenience, assorted ex-
penses, loss of reasonably foreseeable business, loss of prepaid
and/or non-refundable vacation expenses, and loss of a 'refresh-
ing, memorable vacation."' 55 On May 18, 2001, American Air-
lines Flight 100 from New York to London was scheduled to
depart at 6:35 p.m. 56 However, "due to maintenance problems
on two different aircraft," one on the on-time scheduled flight
(aircraft no. 7BB) and the other on a substitute (aircraft no.
7BC), "Flight 100 was delayed and ultimately [canceled] at 1:10
a.m. on May 19, 2001." 57
In its ruling, the district court examined whether American
Airlines "took all necessary measures" in response to the plain-
tiff's allegations that it "(1) failed to begin repairs on the first
aircraft in a timely manner; (2) failed to secure alternate trans-
portation for Plaintiffs for that evening; (3) failed to have a rea-
sonable number of spare aircraft available; and (4) failed to
disclose to passengers that the delay was caused by an out-of-
service aircraft."58 The court held that American Airlines did fail
to disclose the delay, despite admitting that the airline took the
necessary measures in the remaining allegations.59  The court
held that "[c]ommunicating accurate information [was] a rea-
sonable measure [that] American [Airlines] should have taken
55 Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 355 F.3d 386, 387 (5th Cir. 2004).
56 Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CIVA3:01-CV-1179-P, 2004 WL 2624647, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2004).
57 Id.
58 Id. at *2.
59 Id. at *4.
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to enable passengers to avoid the damage caused by the delay. 60
However, the court granted American Airlines partial summary
judgment as to damages for "inconvenience and loss of a re-
freshing, memorable vacation," reasoning that these allegations
amounted to damages for mental injuries, which are unrecover-
able under the Warsaw Convention.61 The appellate court af-
firmed the district court's findings and stated that the damages
the plaintiffs contended were purely economic in nature were
''merely an attempted re-characterization of mental anguish
damages" and, thus, were "not recoverable under the Warsaw
Convention.,"62
Similarly, in Chau v. Delta, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against
Delta Airlines claiming damages for "false imprisonment, em-
barrassment, and emotional distress" arising from an incident in
which they were ordered off an aircraft before takeoff following
a dispute between them and another passenger.6 3 As a conse-
quence, they were forced to travel on a flight the following
day.64 The passengers claimed general damages of $10,000, spe-
cial damages of $500, and punitive damages of $10,000.65
In its ruling, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice recognized
that neither Article 17 nor Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention
permits recovery for purely mental or psychological injuries.66
In its reasoning, the court cited two U.S. cases holding that Arti-
cle 19 did not support a claim for psychological or emotional
injury.6 7 Delta did not dispute special damages representing ac-
60 Id.
61 See Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 355 F.3d 386, 387 (5th Cir. 2004).
62 Id.
63 Chau v. Delta, [2003] 67 O.R. 3d 108, paras. 2-3 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
64 Id. at para. 2.
65 Id. at para. 3.
66 Id. at paras. 14-20.
67 Id. at paras. 18-19. In Barrett v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 92C 5578, 1994 WL
419637, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 1994), the court concluded that Article 19 could
not be relied upon by these passengers for their mental distress claims. The
judge found that the Supreme Court's decision in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd
concluded that the Warsaw Convention did not intend to create a cause of action
for mental injuries. Id. at *3. The judge reasoned that, given that the Supreme
Court had decided that Article 17 does not permit such recovery in the case of an
accident, it would "def[y] common sense" to interpret Article 19 to permit such
recovery in the less serious situation of mere delay. Id. In Fields v. BWA Interna-
tional Airways Ltd., No. 99-CV-2493(JG), 2000 WL 1091129, at *3, *6 (E.D.N.Y.
July 7, 2000), the court, while accepting that the plaintiffs claim arose out of
delay and was therefore within the parameters of Article 19, concluded that dam-
ages claimed solely for emotional stress were not available under Article 19 of the
Warsaw Convention.
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commodation, meals, and other expenses associated with the
overnight stay.68
In Roh v. Korean Air, the plaintiffs brought suit against Korean
Air seeking to recover mental injuries for anxiety and delay.69
On January 22, 2007, flight KE 8674 took off on schedule from
Kota Kinabalu Airport in Malaysia, bound for Seoul, South Ko-
rea.70 Soon after take-off, the cockpit crew found an abnormal-
ity with the left engine and diverted the plane back to Kota
Kinabalu. 7' After staying overnight at hotels provided by Ko-
rean Air, all of the passengers were able to take the substitute
flight that Korean Air sent from Incheon Airport the following
day.72 As a result, the passengers arrived at Incheon Airport fif-
teen hours later than the scheduled arrival time.73
When determining applicable law, the Korea Daejeon District
Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that Korean domestic
law should apply.74 The court noted that the Hague Protocol of
1955 should be applied because the Republic of Korea was not a
party to the Montreal Convention when the case was brought.75
In its ruling, the court made three points acknowledging that
Articles 17, 19, and 20 of the Warsaw Convention were relevant
to the case. First, the anxiety that the plaintiffs allegedly exper-
ienced did not fall within Korean Air's liability because Article
17 excludes liability for damage caused by purely mental injury.
Second, the fifteen hour delay that passengers experienced
came within the purview of Article 19.76 Third, Korean Air took
all necessary measures to avoid the damage, or it was impossible
for them to take such measures, and, thus, Korean Air should be
exempted from liability.77
When examining the "taken all necessary measures" test, the
court considered and acknowledged that: (1) the abnormality of
the engine-the cause of delay-was not foreseen, and the en-
gine manufacturer admitted that there was a design-related de-
fect on the engine type in question and started to produce a
68 Chau, 67 O.R. 3d at paras. 2-3.
69 Daejeon District Court [Dist. Ct.] 2007 Ga-Hap 3098, June 20, 2009 (S. Ko-
rea) (on file with authors).
70 Id. at 10.
71 Id.




76 Id. at 12.
77 Id.
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newly-designed product after the incident; (2) the cockpit crew
acted properly in the state of emergency according to the man-
ual; (3) Korean Air's staff at Kota Kinabalu Airport took neces-
sary measures to minimize the passengers' inconvenience; and
(4) Korean Air provided the substitute flight as soon as practi-
cally possible.78
The plaintiff in Lukacs v. United Airlines, Inc. was booked on a
United Airlines flight from Winnipeg to Ohio, which required a
stop in Chicago.79 The trip was to attend a conference at Ohio
University, and the opening day of the conference was the event
of most interest to the plaintiff.80
The first leg of the flight was canceled due to a mechanical
problem.8 ' The next United Airlines flight to Chicago departed
at a time that would have caused the plaintiff to miss the first
day of the conference. 2 He declined a ticket on that flight, and
no other options were offered to him.83 Also, no timely flights
existed with competitor airlines, so the plaintiff elected to go
home. 4 United provided the plaintiff with a full refund of his
ticket price and also conceded responsibility for the ground
transportation charges-$80.00-he incurred. 5  Unsatisfied,
the plaintiff sought damages for "inconvenience and mental
anguish" and "missed academic, research and learning opportu-
nities."8 6 The case presented four questions for the court, the
most significant of which were:
(1) were the damages claimed "occasioned by delay?"; and
(2) "[did the [carrier] take all measures that could reasonably
be required to avoid the damages?"8 7
The court rejected United's defense that there was no delay as
a matter of fact.8 United argued that there was no delay be-
cause the plaintiff was offered a substitute flight the next morn-
ing and had refused this option, i.e., the cause of any damages
78 Id.
79 Lukacs v. United Airlines, Inc., [2009] 237 Man. R. 2d 75, para. 6 (Can.
Man. Q.B.).
so Id. at para. 5.
81 Id. at para. 7.
82 Id.
83 Id. at paras. 7, 12.
84 Id. at para. 12.
85 Id. at para. 13.
86 Id. at para. 2.
87 Id. at paras. 46-47.
88 Id. at paras. 35, 46.
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was because the plaintiff did not exercise the offered alternative.89
The court held that there was a delay in fact, despite the offer of
a ticket for the next day's flight, as the plaintiffs stated purpose
of travel was to attend the first day of the conference." This
reasoning demonstrates the flexibility of the Montreal Conven-
tion to adapt to claimants' particular circumstances.
Next, the court found that the carrier did not take all reasona-
ble steps required to avoid the damages.9" The court criticized
United and found that the plaintiffs original problems were
caused by the carrier not having an appropriate aircraft on hand
for the purpose.9 2 To its detriment, United did not raise evi-
dence of what had gone wrong, nor did it provide evidence as to
why a replacement aircraft could not be sourced from a nearby
hub.93
It appears from this selection of case law that, under the con-
ventional regime, Article 19 allows courts to determine whether
damage occurred-and, thus, whether it should be compensa-
ble-based on the facts surrounding the alleged incidence of
delay. Thus, going back to the fictional passengers at the start of
this article, it would not be enough for the unhappy passenger
to claim his delay caused loss-the court would undoubtedly
make an inquiry as to the causes of the delay and the passen-
ger's resultant behavior. Did he choose to give up and go
home? Did he choose to take another flight with another air-
line? Was the airline's staff or plane unprepared and, thus,
somehow culpable for the delay? By leaving these questions to
the tribunal of fact, Article 19 exhibits a fluidity in application
that protects both the rights of passengers and air carriers.
B. CASE LAw ON NONPERFORMANCE
Except for the recovery of pure mental injury and punitive
damages-which are not recoverable under either the Montreal
Convention or the Warsaw Convention-the conventions simply
provide a pass-through to applicable domestic law to determine
the limits of recoverable compensatory damages.94 However,
the issue of whether the limits of compensatory damages-
which are not expressly addressed by the Montreal or Warsaw
89 Id. at para. 35.
90 Id. at para. 46.
91 Id. at para. 47.
92 Id. at para. 48.
93 Id.
94 See DEMPSEY & MILDE, supra note 35, at 204.
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Conventions-are applicable to the conventions is also subject
to domestic law and to the court's interpretation. 95 In other
words, while damages expressly addressed in the Montreal Con-
vention must be recovered within its scope, other types of dam-
ages may or may not be recovered within its scope, as
determined by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
A classic example is denied boarding-also known as "bump-
ing"-which is not expressly addressed under the Montreal Con-
vention. 6 In Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., it was determined
that denied boarding constituted a delay if an airline offered
substitute transportation and was therefore covered by the Mon-
treal Convention." In contrast, in Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines,
Ltd., the court found that the Montreal Convention preempted
all passenger claims brought under federal or state law where
applicable and, thus, held that denied boarding did not consti-
tute a delay under Article 19 of the Montreal Convention."8
However, the plaintiffs' breach of contract action was allowed to
proceed against the airline because the airline had made no of-
fer to the plaintiffs to provide them with alternative flights or
other compensation.99
In Malek v. Societe Air France, the plaintiff brought an action
based on the exception in Weiss.'00 On November 15, 2005, the
plaintiff missed a flight from Paris to Newark "when his connect-
ing flight from Venice was delayed arriving in Paris."' ' Rather
than lodging a complaint based on the delay when leaving Ven-
ice, the complaint focused on the response of Air France once
the plaintiff arrived in Paris. 10 2 The plaintiff claimed damages
for having to wait eight hours for another flight, having to pay
for refreshments, and the inconvenience of arriving at John F.
Kennedy Airport rather than Newark, the original destina-
tion. °3 The court held that the plaintiffs attempt to bring this
case under the exception set forth in Weiss failed, adding that
while "Weiss dealt with the denial of service" where the plaintiff
was "not provided with an acceptable alternative," this case dealt
95 See id.
96 See, e.g., Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361, 365-69
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
97 Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d. 106, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
98 Weiss, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
99 Id. at 370.
100 Malek v. Societe Air France, 827 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2006).
10 Id. at 486.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 486-87.
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with "a delay in providing a forwarding flight after [the] plaintiff
missed the flight.1 1 4 Thus, after considering Article 19 of the
Montreal Convention, the court held that it preempted the state
law claims because delay was explicitly dealt with in the Mon-
treal Convention.1 0
5
Cancellation is another example of an issue regarding
whether types of damages not expressly addressed by the Mon-
treal or Warsaw Conventions are recoverable under them. The
issue of whether cancellation constitutes delay has been dis-
cussed in Mullaney v. Delta Airlines, Inc.1°6 On October 28, 2007,
the plaintiff was scheduled to fly to New York from Paris on a
flight operated by Air France, which had a partnership with
Delta.10 7 Delta canceled the scheduled flight due to a strike by
employees of Air France.10 8 Although Delta promised to reim-
burse passengers who booked on another carrier, the plaintiff
could not get a seat for three days due to the large number of
stranded passengers.10 9 In response to the plaintiffs complaint
relying on, inter alia, a violation of New York's consumer protec-
tion statute, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment, Delta
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Montreal Convention
preempted the state law causes of action." 0o
The court drew a distinction between delay and non-perform-
ance, holding that non-performance was not preempted by Arti-
cle 19 of the Montreal Convention."' The court also noted
that, in recent years, "a number of courts concluded that where
the facts pleaded in the complaint [added] up to non-perform-
ance, rather than simply delay, the Convention does not pre-
empt other claims."'"12 The court specifically referred to In re
Nigeria Charter Flights Contract Litigation, which identified the cir-
cumstances that would favor a finding of delay as opposed to
non-performance: (1) "the defendant airlines ultimately pro-
vided plaintiff[ ] with transportation;" (2) the plaintiff "secured
alternate transportation without waiting to find out whether the
104 Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
105 Id.
106 Mullaney v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7324, 2009 WL 1584899, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2009).




"'I Id. at *2.
112 Id.
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defendant airlines would transport" him; or (3) the plaintiff "re-
fused [the airline's] offer of a later flight."' 13
It appears that, depending on the facts of the case, a domestic
law claim made against a carrier for non-performance will be
permissible if the facts demonstrate that the contract of carriage
was simply not performed as anticipated, as opposed to causing a
long delay before performing the relevant carriage. Accord-
ingly, there seems to be no need to enact further domestic or
regional legislative regimes to deal with damages occasioned by
delay or non-performance, as local law already provides a con-
tractual remedy in all jurisdictions, albeit under different
names.'14 However, this understanding has not stopped further
legislation from occurring in various jurisdictions as a response
to contemporary passenger rights protection policies. 15
IV. EC REGULATION 261/2004
On February 17, 2004, the European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union adopted European Community
Regulation 261 (EC Regulation) establishing legal rights for pas-
sengers when they have been denied boarding against their
wills, when their flights are canceled, or when their flights are
delayed." 6 As remedies for passengers (and perhaps as punish-
ment for the relevant air carriers), the EC Regulation provides
compensation, reimbursement or rerouting, or care and assis-
tance, depending on the situation. 11 7 As such, this legislation
implements European Union (EU) regional consumer rights or
welfare policy. 1I 8 The EC Regulation applies to passengers de-
parting from an airport located in an EU member state and to
passengers departing from any other airport to an airport in an
11 In re Nigeria Charter Flights Contract Litig., 520 F. Supp. 2d 447, 453
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
114 See generally Julian Hermida, Convergence of Civil Law and Common Law Con-
tracts in the Space Field, available at http://www.julianhermida.com/dossier/
dossierpubhk.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2012) (arguing that as time has passed, the
contract law of civil and common law jurisdictions has taken on more similarities
with each other than differences).
115 Regulation 261/2004, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
February 2004 Establishing Common Rules on Compensation and Assistance to
Passengers in the Event of Denied Boarding and of Cancellation or Long Delay
of Flights, and Repealing Regulation 295/91/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 46) arts. 4-6
(EC) [hereinafter EC Regulation].
116 Id. at paras. 10, 12-13, 17.
117 Id. at paras. 10, 12.
118 See id. at para. 1.
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EU member state when the carrier operating the flight is a
"Community carrier.""' 9 In this respect, its application to for-
eign air carriers is less controversial than the unilateral imposi-
tion of the EU's Trading Scheme (ETS or EU ETS) on foreign
air carriers from January 1, 2012. 121 Specifically, the EC Regula-
tion does not apply to incoming air carriers' flights to EU mem-
ber states, and is instead limited solely to European Community
(EC or Community) air carriers. 12 1
The EC Regulation aims to provide immediate and uniform
assistance to remedy inconvenience suffered by passengers who
experience long flight-related delays. 122 A secondary objective
appears to be to actually reduce the inconvenience of delay, as
air transport is now seen as a necessity rather than a luxury. 12 3
The EC Regulation distinguishes between "denied boarding,"
"cancellation," and "delay" and, in doing so, is triggered when a
prescribed event occurs, imposing upon air carriers certain obli-
gations to provide assistance.1 24 Assistance may take the form of
"compensation" (Article 7), "reimbursement or re-routing" (Ar-
ticle 8), or passenger "care" (Article 9).25 Under the EC Regu-
lation, compensation is available in scenarios involving denied
boarding and cancellation, but not delay.1 26 Article 6 of the EC
Regulation sets forth the criteria of delay that result in an enti-
119 Id. art. 3(1).
120 The original scheme was established by Directive 2003/87/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 Establishing a Scheme
for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community and
Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC. See generally 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32. The
application to foreign carriers was made by Directive 2008/101/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of November 19, 2008, amending Directive
2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading within the Community. See generally 2009 OJ. (L 8) 3.
The validity of the latter regulation's purported attempt to apply the ETS to for-
eign air carriers was recently upheld by the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Justice in Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Secretary of State for Energy &
Climate Change, ECJ (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of
Justice of England and Wales, Queen's Bench Division, Administrative Court
(United Kingdom)), Case C-366/10, 2010 E.C.R. 0. See also Part VII(B)(2),
below.
121 EC Regulation, supra note 115, art. 3(1)(b).
122 Id. at Intro.
123 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil, at 2, COM (2011) 174 final (Apr. 11, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
transport/passengers/doc/com_2011_174_communicationen.pdf (last visited
Feb. 28, 2012).
124 EC Regulation, supra note 115, arts. 4-6.
125 Id. arts. 7-9.
126 Id. arts. 4-6; see id. arts. 7-9.
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tlement to care (Article 8) or reimbursement within seven days
(Article 9).127
However, even for a flight cancellation, the air carrier is not
obliged to pay compensation if it can prove that the cancellation
was "caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not
have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been
taken. '2 28 It is worth noting that this wording is quite similar to
Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention and the second sentence of
Article 19 of the Montreal Convention. 129
Where payable, compensation is based on prescribed catego-
ries of scheduled flight distance. For flights:
* 1,500 km or less, C250 is payable to the passenger;
* wholly within the EC of more than 1,500 km, or non intra-
Community between 1,500 and 3,500 kin, C400 is payable;
and
* other than these, compensation of C600 is payable.130
Delays typically attract, relative to duration and circumstances,
an entitlement to meals and refreshments, hotel accommoda-
tion, transport, and access to communications. 13' Delays for
more than five hours entitle passengers to reimbursement or
rerouting. 3 2
V. SIGNIFICANT EUROPEAN JUDICIAL ATTENTION ON
THE VALIDITY OF EC REGULATION 261/2004
A. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE EC REGULTION-2006
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE JUDGMENT
The EC Regulation was met with fierce criticism from air car-
riers and their trade associations. 133 Particularly, airlines argued
that Articles 5 and 6 of the EC Regulation are legally incompati-
ble with the Montreal Convention. 134 More specifically, the In-
ternational Air Transport Association (IATA) claimed that, in
127 Id. arts. 6, 8-9.
128 Id. art. 5(3).
129 Compare id., with Montreal Convention, supra note 32, art. 19, and Warsaw
Convention, supra note 7, art. 20.
130 EC Regulation, supra note 115, art. 7(1).
131 Id. art. 9.
132 Id. arts. 6(1)(c) (3), 8(1)(a).
133 See Press Release, Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n, IATA Challenges EU on Flawed
Regulation Airlines Can't Make the Sunshine (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://
www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2004-04-21-01.aspx.
134 See, e.g., Case C-344/04, Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n v. Dep't for Transp., 2006
E.C.R. 1-00403, para. 38.
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the case of delay-related damages, the absence of any defense or
limitation in liability was contrary to the obligations of the EC
and its member states under the Montreal Convention.' 35 The
IATA also pointed out that the EC Regulation is in contraven-
tion of Article 29 of the Montreal Convention, which ensures
the convention's exclusivity.136 In July 2004, the UK High Court
referred the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).' 37
The judgment of the ECJ in International Air Transportation
Ass'n v. Department of Transportation (IATA Case) rejected the air-
lines' claim with regard to the EC Regulation. 13 The judgment
has been criticized on the grounds that the ECJ disregarded the
plain wording of the Montreal Convention and purports to ap-
prove an additional level of liability above and beyond the com-
mon expectation of the parties to the Montreal Convention.139
In a short judgment, the court upheld the validity of the EC
Regulation and controversially ruled there was no conflict with
EU member states' treaty obligations under the Montreal Con-
vention. 140 The court's consideration of the EC Regulation's
compatibility with the Montreal Convention can be reduced to
four major conclusions:
(1) Articles 19, 22, and 29 of the Montreal Convention only gov-
ern the basis upon which an individual person might bring a
court action for compensation with respect to delay under a
contract of air carriage; 14
(2) There was no indication that the Montreal Convention was
"intended to shield those carriers from any other form of
intervention" or, in particular, regulatory action designed to
facilitate standardized, immediate assistance to passengers
experiencing flight delays;142
35 Press Release, Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n, supra note 133.
136 Intl Air Transp. Ass'n, 2006 E.C.R at paras. 38-39.
137 Id. at Issue 1 & para. 36.
138 Id. at Summary para. 5.
139 See Kinga Arnold & Pablo Mendes de Leon, Regulation EC 261/2004 in Light
of the Recent Decisions of the European Court of Justice: Time for a Change?, 35 AIR &
SPACE L. 91, 93-94, 110 (2010); Paul Stephen Dempsey & Svante O. Johansson,
Montreal v. Brussels: The Conflict of Laws on the Issue of Delay in International Air
Carriage, 35 AIR & SPACE L. 207, 208, 219-20 (2010).
140 Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n, 2006 E.C.R. at Summary para. 2.
141 Id. at para. 44.
142 Id. at para. 45. However, it is settled in the history of the conventional
regime that a quid pro quo (strict liability for the benefit of passengers, in ex-
change for limitations on maximum compensation payable by air carriers) did
and does exist to "shield carriers from potentially devastating aviation ... damage
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(3) There are two types of damage that passengers may suffer as
a result of delay:
a. "damage that is almost identical for every passenger, re-
dress for which may take the form of standardized and
immediate assistance or care .. .through the provision,
for example, of refreshments, meals and accommoda-
tion;" and
b. individual damage suffered by passengers, "redress for
which requires a case-by-case assessment ... of the dam-
age caused" and which can thus only be granted "on an
individual basis; and"'43
(4) The court asserted that the Montreal Convention only cap-
tured the latter, and the EC Regulation, as a result, filled a
legal void to allow the former type of damage to be ad-
dressed. 14 4 Accordingly, the EC Regulation operates at "an
earlier stage than the [Convention]" and, thus, "cannot be




The court likewise dispensed with the other grounds of the
plaintiffs' challenge. 46 The many criticisms of this decision are
not the focus of this article, as they have been canvassed exhaus-
tively elsewhere; 147 however, they have been set out below for
completeness. The article will then turn to listing the pending
judicial questions as to the validity of the EC Regulation to
demonstrate that the EC Regulation suffers more in its applica-
tion than Article 19 of the Montreal Convention. Finally, the
article will add to the corpus of reasons for amendment or re-
peal of the EC Regulation by noting deficiencies in past regula-
tory reviews and listing the recent events which have cast doubt
on the law's utility. All of these provide pragmatic, as well as
legal, reasons for reform or repeal.
1. Criticism 1: Interpretive Deficiencies
The ECJ has preferred a narrow, beneficially exclusionary in-
terpretation of the provisions of the Montreal Convention. For
example, the court held that Articles 19, 22(1), and 29 only deal
with individual actions for delay.148 This ignores the broader po-
awards" (at least in the industry's infancy). DEMPSEY & MILDE, supra note 35, at
11.
143 Int'l Air Transp. Assn, 2006 E.C.R. at para. 43.
144 Id. at paras. 43-48.
145 Id. at paras. 46, 48.
146 Id. at paras. 49-100.
147 See, e.g., Dempsey &Johansson, supra note 139, at 207.
148 Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n, 2006 E.C.R. at paras. 41-44.
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litical context of the treaty and amounts to a selective reading of
its text. The Preamble to the Montreal Convention demon-
strates that it is intended to be exclusive as to how, and the ex-
tent to which, an air carrier bears liability.' 49 UK courts have
previously held, when construing such provisions, that the Mon-
treal and Warsaw Conventions must be considered as a whole to
apply a purposive interpretation. 5 ' As Lord Hope held in
Sidhu, citing the unification purpose of the treaty, "exceptions to
these rules should not be permitted, except where the Conven-
tion itself provides for them.' 1 51 In taking such a restrictive in-
terpretation, the ECJ has ignored the mandatory approach
under international legal interpretation rules by failing to inter-
pret the Montreal Convention's provisions in light of their ob-
ject and purpose. 152
2. Criticism 2: The False Dichotomy of Damages Caused by Delay
The ECJ distinguishes between two kinds of damages occa-
sioned by delay. 153 This distinction has been criticized and ap-
pears to have no basis in precedent or doctrine. 54 It presents
what may be termed a "false dichotomy." Damage which is con-
sidered to be the "same for every passenger" is still a species of
damage, but it is difficult to categorize such damage as identical
amongst passengers. Note again the example at the start of this
article. 15 5 Surely, those two passengers suffer different levels of
damage. Only food and drink requirements could perceivably
be similar. Regarding financial compensation, however, passen-
gers clearly do not suffer identical losses. An instrument such as
the EC Regulation may under- or over-compensate. At any rate,
Professors Dempsey and Johansson observe that payments
149 Montreal Convention, supra note 32, pmbl.
150 See, e.g., Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., [1937] 1 K.B. 50, 74-76 (Greene
LJ.); Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, Ltd. [1980] UKHL 6, 7-8, [1981] A.C. 251,
252 (Lord Diplock).
151 Sidhu v. British Airways, Plc, [1997] A.C. 430, 444 (H.L.).
152 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (providing that "A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.").
153 Int'l Air Transp. Assn, 2006 E.C.R. at para. 43.
154 Memorandum from John Balfour on EC Law v. Int'l Law - The Judgment
of the European Court of Justice on the Challenge to Regulation 261/2004 on
Denied Boarding, Cancellation, & Long Delay of Flights (Feb. 2006) (on file with
author).
155 See supra p. 45.
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under the EC Regulation are not, in reality, standardized be-
cause they vary with "the distance flown and time of delay. 1 56
Furthermore, the ECJ's contention that the EC Regulation
does not capture the first type of damage is incorrect. Article 19
of the Montreal Convention provides for recovery of "damages
occasioned by delay.""' Claims in several jurisdictions establish
that recovery under Article 19 includes a full range of reasona-
ble consequential losses experienced by passengers, as well as
those identified by the ECJ, though notably this does not in-
clude mental distress.1 5
8
3. Criticism 3: Earlier in Time Application than Article 19
By characterizing the two delay-related laws as differing in
their periods of applicability-the EC Regulation is purported
to apply at an "earlier stage" than the Montreal Convention-
the ECJ may have avoided legitimate engagement with the ques-
tion of whether the EC Regulation and Article 19 of the Mon-
treal Convention conflict. It is useful to observe that while the
Montreal Convention makes an explicit provision for advance
payments that can be made in the case of aircraft accidents re-
sulting in death or injury, subject to the relevant state's national
law, no such provision is made in the case of delay.' 59 The legal
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius6 ° controls situations
156 Dempsey & Johansson, supra note 139, at 219.
157 Montreal Convention, supra note 32, art. 19.
158 See, e.g., Lopez v. Eastern Airlines, 677 F. Supp. 181, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(compensatory damages for out-of-pocket expenses, loss of time, anxiety and
frustration); Harpalani v. Air India, 634 F. Supp. 797, 798 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (cost of
accommodation and transportation where passenger missed connecting flight);
Johnson v. Nw. Orient Airlines, 642 P.2d 1067, 1067-68 (Mont. 1982) (loss of
earnings occasioned by delay recoverable); Lukacs v. United Airlines, Inc., [2009]
237 Man. R. 2d 75, paras. 13, 65 (Can. Man. Q.B.) (reimbursement of ticket and
cost of ground transportation-but, note, not mental anguish).
159 Montreal Convention, supra note 32, art. 28.
160 Literally, "to express one thing is to exclude another." Richard C. Edwards,
Researching Legislative Histoiy, LEGISLATIvE REFERENCE BUREAU, http://www.ilga.
gov/commission/lrb/lrbres.htm (last updated Oct. 2008). The Law Council of
Australia expressed the maxim in 2001 as follows: "The Expressio Unius principle
means that an express reference to one matter indicates that other matters are to
be excluded. This principle is based on the notion that where legislation in-
cludes provisions relating to similar matters in different terms, there is an impli-
cation that there is a deliberate intention to deal with them differently." Law
Council of Austl., Submission to the Copyright Law Review Committee-"Copyright and
Contract", AUSTRALASIAN LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.austlii.edu.
au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/other/clrc/2/submissions/28.html?stem=O&synonyms=
0&query=expressio%20uniussection4 (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
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such as these. It is reasonable to conclude that, in a convention
intended to exclusively and uniformly provide liability rules and
fix limits on remedies for certain types of damage, the drafters
of the Montreal Convention and the ratifying states have pur-
posefully excluded the mention of payment of compensation at
an "earlier stage" for delay. Whether such an intention was to
be expressed, or will be expressed in the future, is properly a
question for future amendment of the Montreal Convention,
not parallel regional legislation that purports to usurp true in-
ternational agreement.
B. SIGNIFICANT JURISPRUDENCE ON EC REGULATION 261/2004
SINCE THE 2006 CHALLENGE
In recent times, two particular ECJ judgments interpreting
the EC Regulation have brought ambiguities within the EC Reg-
ulation into sharp relief. The decisions indicate that attempts to
introduce passenger protection policies into air transport are
fraught with the kind of danger that threatens the uniformity
and quid pro quo which was struck between the rights and inter-
ests of air carriers and passengers within the Montreal Conven-
tion regime. 61
The first of these came from a reference for a preliminary
ruling from the Handelsgericht Wien (Austria) on the applica-
tion of Wallentin-Hernann v. Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane SpA.16 2
In the proceedings, Alitalia refused to pay compensation to the
applicant passenger, whose flight had been canceled. a61 Alitalia
claimed that there was no obligation to pay compensation under
Article 7 of the EC Regulation because the cancellation was
"caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not have
been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been
taken.' 64 In fact, the cause of the relevant flight cancellation
had been a "complex engine defect in the turbine. 1165 The Dis-
trict Commercial Court for Vienna upheld the applicant's claim
for compensation pursuant to Articles 5(1) (c) and 7(1) of the
161 The quid pro quo can be thought of as the balance struck between dispen-
sation of the onerous need by claimants to prove negligence or similar types of
claims-e.g., passenger death or injury-in exchange for limited liability on the
part of the air carrier. See DEMPSEY & MILDE, supra note 35, at 14-15.
162 Case C-549/07, Wallentin-Hermann v. Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane SpA,
2008 E.C.R. 1-11061.
163 Id. at para. 12.
164 Id. at paras. 6, 13.
165 Id. at para. 11.
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EC Regulation "on the ground that the technical defects which
affected the aircraft ... were not covered by the 'extraordinary
circumstances' provided for in Article 5(3). "166
The Viennese court stayed proceedings and sought a ruling
from the ECJ on four questions, primarily whether a technical
defect in an aircraft constitutes an "extraordinary circum-
stances" exemption from the EC Regulation. 1 6 7 Because there is
no definition of "extraordinary circumstances" apart from a refer-
ence in the Recitals of the EC Regulation, the court held that
the usual meaning in everyday language must be applied to de-
termine the meaning of the term, and "when those terms ap-
pear in a provision which constitutes a derogation from a
principle or, more specifically, from Community rules for the
protection of consumers, they must be read so that that provi-
sion can be interpreted strictly."' 68 In this case, the ECJ held
that the Recitals of the EC Regulation explain its content-that
consumer protection for passengers was a prime objective.169
The court held that, because Article 5(3) -the exemption for
"extraordinary circumstances"-derogates from the right to
compensation, it must be interpreted strictly. 170 Thus, the indic-
ative events in Recital 14 did not fully control the exemption;
there needed to be something additional that would character-
ize the cancellation as "extraordinary.' 1 71 It was concluded that
technical problems "caused by failure to maintain an aircraft
must therefore be regarded as inherent in the normal exercise
of an air carrier's activity." '172 To compound matters, the court
also concluded that compliance with "minimum rules on main-
tenance of aircraft [could not] in itself suffice to establish that
[the] carrier ha[d] taken 'all reasonable measures' within the
166 Id. at para. 13.
167 Id. at para. 14.
168 Id. at para. 17.
169 Id. at para. 18.
170 Id. at para. 20.
171 Id. at para. 25. The text of Recital 14 provides: "As under the Montreal
Convention, obligations on operating air carriers should be limited or excluded
in cases where an event has been caused by extraordinary circumstances which
could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken.
Such circumstances may, in particular, occur in cases of political instability, mete-
orological conditions incompatible with the operation of the flight concerned,
security risks, unexpected flight safety shortcomings and strikes that affect the
operation of an operating air carrier." EC Regulation, supra note 115, recital 14.
172 Wallentin-Hermann, 2008 E.C.R. at para. 24.
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meaning of Article 5(3)," which would have relieved the carrier
from liability to pay compensation. 7 '
The result of the case, as Professors Mendes de Leon and Ar-
nold suggest, is to severely limit the scope of the basis by which
air carriers may exonerate themselves from the payment of com-
pensation to passengers following flight cancellations. 7 4 It is
clear that air carriers can do nothing more than comply with
required technical maintenance works. To assume otherwise as-
sumes perfect knowledge, the financial wherewithal to keep a
spare aircraft handy, or both. 175 Thus, this decision has doubt-
ful value as a clarification of the term "extraordinary circum-
stances," and no legal certainty is created, notwithstanding that
it is unreasonable for passengers to bear the burden for delays
caused by the repair of a technical defect during regular
maintenance.176
On November 19, 2009, the ECJ delivered an astonishing
judgment. The Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) and the Handel-
sgericht Wien (Austria) courts referred to the ECJ cases regard-
ing flight delays of twenty-five and twenty-two hours in Sturgeon
v. Condor Flugdienst GmbH, and Bdck v. Air France SA (collectively
Sturgeon), respectively. 77 The court made three main points in
Sturgeon that dealt with the concept of "extraordinary circum-
stances. ' 178 The first point was that a flight cannot be consid-
ered canceled simply because there has been a long delay, if all
other aspects of the flight remain unchanged.1 79 Given the facts
that the EC Regulation provides a right to monetary compensa-
tion (Article 7) in cases of denied boarding and cancellation
and such unreasonably long delays had occurred in this case,
the plaintiffs claimed that their sustained damages were the re-
sult of a cancellation rather than a flight delay.'80 However, the
ECJ made it clear that, for the purposes of categorization, "a
flight which is delayed, irrespective of the duration of the delay,
even if it is long, cannot be regarded as [canceled] where the
173 Id. at para. 44.
174 Arnold & Mendes de Leon, supra note 139, at 92.
175 Id. at 106.
176 Id. at 107.
177 Joined Cases C-402/07 & C-432/07, Sturgeon v. Condor Flugdienst GmbH,
B6ck v. Air France SA, 2009 E.C.R. 1-10923, paras. 12, 23.
178 Id. at para. 73.
179 Id.
180 Id. at paras. 8, 14.
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flight is operated in accordance with the air carrier's original
planning."'8'
This point was extended in relation to compensation in the
event of a delay in excess of three hours.1 8 2 The ECJ, after rea-
soning that passengers whose flights have been canceled and
passengers affected by a flight delay suffer similar damage-con-
sisting of a loss of time-held that passengers whose flights are
delayed in excess of three hours may rely on the right to com-
pensation for flight cancellation provided in Article 7 of the EC
Regulation.'8 3 Finally, reinforcing the judgment in Wallentin-
Hermann, the court held that the consequent ability of the air
carrier to escape liability when there were "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" was not triggered by technical problems in an air-
craft unless such problems are "not inherent in the normal
exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and are be-
yond its actual control."'8 4
This judgment must be strongly criticized, primarily because
it brings the already questionable EC Regulation into further
conflict with the Montreal Convention. Article 29 of the Mon-
treal Convention, which deals with the fundamental principle of
the Montreal Convention-that it provides an exclusive rem-
edy-is blatantly disregarded by the ECJ in Sturgeon.'8 5 Balfour
argues that this means there is now effectively an "entitlement to
compensation ... [for] passengers who suffer delay so that they
reach their final destination three hours or more after the origi-
nally scheduled arrival time." 186 It is clear that delay is a form of
compensable damage under the Montreal Convention. And yet,
the EU, of which all member states are parties to the Montreal
Convention, implemented the EC Regulation involving denied
boarding, cancellation, and delay. Moreover, its principal court,
the ECJ, has here explicitly adjudicated on a means by which the
EC Regulation can be stretched to accommodate compensation
to passengers for delay.
The decision is difficult to reconcile with not only the Mon-
treal Convention, as it traverses issues of delay, but also with the
way the court interpreted the Recitals and Articles of the EC




185 Compare id., with Montreal Convention, supra note 32, art. 29.
186 John Balfour, Airline Liability for Delays: The Court of Justice of the EU Rewrites
EC Regulation 261/2004, 35 AIR & SPACE L. 71, 72 (2010).
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Regulation.1 17 According to Community case law, the interpre-
tation of provisions of Community law must be made by consid-
eration, not only of its wording, but also "the context in which it
occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is
part."' 8 Accordingly, the reasons for the adoption of a Commu-
nity law must be considered when interpreting such a provi-
sion-in this case, the fact that the EC Regulation explicitly only
purports to deal with certain types of compensation, i.e., denied
boarding and cancellation. 8 9 The same is true for the express
statements from the travaux preparatoires of the European Com-
mission, which note that "the Commission considers that in pre-
sent circumstances operators should not be obliged to
compensate delayed passengers."190
Notwithstanding the Community principle of "equal treat-
ment" (which is reminiscent of the common law principle of
stare decisis), 19' it is the ECJ's role under the EC Treaty to "ob-
serve," rather than create or amend, the law, unlike the role of
appellate judges in common law jurisdictions who may extend
the application of existing law to novel situations in certain cir-
cumstances.1 92 The Sturgeon judgment effectively creates new
law and does not take the wise counsel of the Advocate General,
who recommended that the court should reopen oral submis-
sions on the question of whether the EC Regulation is invalid
insofar as it "draw[s] a distinction between cancellation and de-
lay ... in light of the principle of equal treatment. ' 193 By not
taking the Advocate General's advice, the court has arguably ex-
187 Arnold & Mendes de Leon, supra note 139, at 100.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council Establishing Common Rules on Compensation and Assistance to
Air Passengers in the Event of Denied Boarding and of Cancellation or Long Delay of
Fights, at para. 23, COM (2001) 784 final (Dec. 21, 2001)).
191 Stare decisis is the doctrine that common law courts abide by, under which
they adhere to or follow decisions of higher courts that have been decided previ-
ously, whereas the EU legal principle of "equal treatment" requires "that compa-
rable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not
be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectivelyjustified." Case C-
127/07, Socit6 Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine v. Premier Ministre, 2008 E.C.R. I-
09895, para. 43.
192 Arnold & Mendes de Leon, supra note 139, at 104.
193 Id.
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ercised a legislative prerogative by treating delay as "de facto
cancellation." 194
Since Sturgeon, there have been a number of decisions from
the ECJ in relation to the EC Regulation. On May 12, 2011, in
Ratnieks v. Latvijas Republikas Ekonomikas Ministrija, the ECJ held
that the "all reasonable measures" portion of Article 5(3) of the
EC Regulation 9 5 must be interpreted as meaning that when or-
ganizing a flight, an air carrier must "take account of the risk of
delay" and, therefore, build in a "reserve time to allow it, if possi-
ble, to operate the flight in its entirety once the extraordinary
circumstances have come to an end."' 96 This is an extraordinary
decision because the flight in Ratnieks was first canceled due to
an airspace closure resulting from problems with radar and
other aviation systems and then again later due to the expiry of
the crew's maximum permitted duty time. 197 However, the
court justified its decision by referring to paragraph 42 of Wal-
lentin-Hermann, where the court held that "it was necessary to
ascertain whether the air carrier ... had taken measures appro-
priate to the particular situation.""19 As such, the court con-
tended it had hit upon a "flexible concept of reasonable
measures."'
199
The result is that no minimum reserve time is imposed on air
carriers, and national courts are to assess whether, in the cir-
cumstances of particular cases, the air carrier should have been
regarded as having taken an appropriate measure in the situa-
tion.20 The assessment of the carrier's ability to undertake the
planned flight in its entirety following the new conditions, i.e.,
after the extraordinary circumstances have passed, "must be car-
ried out in such a way as to ensure that the length of the re-
quired reserve time does not result in the air carrier being led to
194 Joined Cases C-402/07 & C-432/07, Sturgeon v. Condor Flugdienst GmbH,
B6ck v. Air France SA, 2009 E.C.R. 1-10923, paras. 91-95.
195 EC 261/2004, Article 5(3) provides: "An operating air carrier shall not be
obliged to pay compensation in accordance with Article 7, if it can prove that the
cancellation is caused by extraordinary circumstances [that] could not have been
avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken." EC Regulation, supra
note 115, art. 5(3).
196 Case C-294/10, Ratnieks v. Latvijas Republikas Ekonomikas Ministrija, 2011
E.C.R. 0, paras. 27-28, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=5721
86:cs&lang=en&list=572186:cs,&pos=1&page=1 &nbl=I &pgs=l 0&hwords=&check
texte=checkbox&visu=#texte.
197 Id. at paras. 9, 15.
198 Id. at para. 29.
199 Id. at para. 30.
20 Id. at paras. 31, 32.
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make intolerable sacrifices in the light of the capacities of its
undertaking at the relevant time."201
Ratnieks demonstrates that the controversial underpinning of
"extraordinary circumstances" from Wallentin-Hermann endures.
The result is that even more uncertainty is evoked in the appli-
cation by national courts of this important method by which air
carriers rely on being able to limit their liability to passengers in
the event of cancellation or long delay, which, post-Sturgeon, is
effectively treated as de facto cancellation.
A further recent interpretation (or perhaps more correctly ex-
trapolation) of what the term "cancellation" means was provided
by the Third Chamber of the ECJ on October 13, 2011, in Rodri-
guez v. Air France SA by way of a reference for a preliminary rul-
ing from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil no. 1 de Pontevedra
(Spain).2 °2 In this case, the passengers departed as planned on
a flight from Paris to Vigo; however, due to a technical problem,
the flight was forced to return to the departure airport.2 111 At Air
France's invitation, three of the passengers took a replacement
flight the next day from Paris to Porto in Portugal, where they
then traveled by taxi to Vigo.2°4 The passengers sought various
damages for breach of contract of carriage by air, including the
fixed sum of C250 each, as prescribed by Article 7 of the EC
Regulation, and non-material damages, such as meals and even
dog kennel charges due to one of the passengers being away
from home longer than expected. 20 5 The ECJ was asked to rule
on whether the term "cancellation," as defined in Article 2(1) of
the EC Regulation, was to be interpreted as meaning:
only the failure of the flight to depart as planned or ... also...
any circumstance as a result of which the flight on which places
are reserved takes off but fails to reach its destination, including
the case in which the flight is forced to return to the airport of
departure for technical reasons [.] 206
It also was asked to rule on whether the term "further compen-
sation," as used in Article 12, was to be interpreted as meaning
that:
201 Id. at para. 37.
202 Case C-83/10, Rodriguez v. Air France SA 2011 E.C.R. 0; [2011] W.L.R. 348
(D).
203 Id. at paras. 19, 20.
204 Id. at para. 21.
205 Id. at para. 23.
206 Id. at para. 24.
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in the event of a cancellation, the national court may award com-
pensation for damage, including non-material damage, for
breach of a contract of carriage by air in accordance with rules
established in national legislation and case-law on breach of con-
tract or, on the contrary, must such compensation relate solely to
appropriately substantiated expenses incurred by passengers and
not adequately indemnified by the carrier in accordance with the
requirements of Articles 8 and 9 of [the EC Regulation], even if
such provisions have not been relied upon or, lastly, are the two
aforementioned notions of further compensation compatible
one with another?
20 7
With respect to the former question, the court noted that it
held in previous cases that the itinerary is an essential element
of the flight.208 Accordingly, it now held that, because the term
"'itinerary' means a journey to be made ... from the airport of
departure to the airport of arrival according to a fixed schedule,
. . . for a flight to have been considered to have been operated,"
it needed to have reached its arrival airport.20 9 Furthermore,
the court held that no express decision by the air carrier cancel-
ing the flight was necessary for such a cancellation to have taken
place. 210 Extending the reasoning in Sturgeon, the court held
that there is cancellation in cases where the original flight is
abandoned and a new flight takes on those passengers, such that
the present situation-the flight taking off and returning to the
departure airport-also constitutes cancellation.2 1 The court also
held that the reason for the return of the flight to the departure
airport was only relevant to determine whether the cancellation
was caused by "extraordinary circumstances," not as to the ac-
tual classification of "cancellation" itself.
2 12
The classification of a flight as canceled when it has taken off
as scheduled but been forced to unexpectedly land is unsatisfac-
tory. The peculiarities of air transport are such that, as a techni-
cal operation, each flight is subject to some uncertainty not
within the control of the air carrier. It seems inequitable that
air carriers would be obligated to pay the compensation ordered
under the EC Regulation when a flight must be terminated un-
expectedly and, at the same time, would not be able to remove
207 Id.
208 Id. at para. 27.
20- Id. at para. 28.
210 Id. at para. 29.
211 Id. at para. 30.
212 Id. at para. 34.
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such liability when the cause of the flight termination was a tech-
nical problem that the air carrier had taken all reasonable mea-
sures to avoid.
Turning to the second question, the court held that the provi-
sion for "further compensation" in Article 12 of the EC Regula-
tion allows national courts to order the air carrier to
compensate passengers for damage arising from breaches of the
contract of carriage on legal bases other than the EC Regula-
tion, namely "the conditions provided for by the Montreal Con-
vention and national law."21 3 This does not mean that national
courts can reimburse passengers whose flights have been
delayed or canceled for expenses the passengers have suffered
due to the failure of the air carrier to fulfill its obligations to
assist and provide care under Articles 8 and 9 of the EC
Regulation.2 14
C. CURRENTLY PENDING PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS IN THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
The sheer volume of preliminary questions awaiting consider-
ation in the ECJ is an indicator that the EC Regulation is not
operating as intended. The language of the EC Regulation is
intended to be widely understandable so that twenty-seven na-
tional courts and national enforcement bodies (NEBs) can eas-
ily apply the substantive provisions. 215 However, this is not the
case. As will be seen below, the reasoning of the decision in
Sturgeon is coming under increasing pressure to be invalidated
on the basis that extending compensation for delay trespasses
on the subject area of Articles 19 and 29 of the Montreal
Convention.
1. Pending Preliminary Questions Relating to EC Regulation 261/
2004
There are at least seven pending references for preliminary
questions before the ECJ at the moment that do not specifically
deal with issues of compatibility with the court's decision in Stur-
geon, compatibility of the EC Regulation with the Montreal Con-
vention, or both;216 however, only one will be reviewed here:
213 Id. at paras. 36, 38.
214 Id. at para. 27.
215 EC Regulation, supra note 115, recitals 21-22.
216 Case C-365/11, Esteves Coelho dos Santos v. TAP Portugal, 2011 O.J. (C
282) 10 (July 8, 2011); Case C-321/11, Rodriguez Cachafeiro v. Iberia, 2011 0J.
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McDonagh v. Ryanair Ltd.217 This reference raises questions that
we contend should also be the major subject of the impending
review of the EC Regulation, as it indicates how having two par-
allel passenger protection laws-the EC Regulation and the
Montreal Convention-for international air travel produces le-
gal uncertainty which does not assist passengers who have suf-
fered delays.
The claimant in this case sought payment for costs incurred of
about C1,130 during a period of seven days in which her Ry-
anair flight could not take off from Faro (bound for Dublin) as
a result of airspace closures brought about by volcanic ash in
European skies. The questions asked of the ECJ in McDonagh
may, given the timeliness of the subject matter, inform the next
review of the EC Regulation, as discussed below. The questions
are worth reproducing in full:
(1) Do circumstances such as the closures of European airspace
as a result of the eruption of the Eyjafjallaj6kull volcano in
Iceland, which caused widespread and prolonged disruption
to air travel, go beyond "extraordinary circumstances" within
the meaning of Regulation 261/2004 [1]?
(2) If the answer to question 1 is yes, is liability for the duty to
provide care excluded under Articles 5 and 9 in such
circumstances?
(3) If the answer to question 2 is no, are Articles 5 and 9 invalid
in so far as they violate the principles of proportionality and
non-discrimination, the principle of an "equitable balance of
interests" enshrined in the Montreal Convention, and Arti-
cles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union?
(4) Is the obligation in Articles 5 and 9 to be interpreted as con-
taining an implied limitation, such as a temporal limit and/
or a monetary limit, to provide care in cases where cancella-
tion is caused by "extraordinary circumstances"?
(5) If the answer to question 4 is no, are Articles 5 and 9 invalid
in so far as they violate the principles of proportionality and
non-discrimination, the principle of an "equitable balance of
interests" enshrined in the Montreal Convention, and Arti-
(C 282) 3 (June 28, 2011); Case C-151/1 1, Condor Flugdienst GmbH v. D6rschel,
2011 0J. (C 151) 12 (Mar. 28, 2011); Case C-22/11, Finnair Oyj v. Lassooy, 2011
0J. (C 80) 15 (Jan. 17, 2011); Case C-11/11, Societe Air France SA v. Folkerts,
2011 0J. (C 95) 5 (Jan. 11, 2011). List current as of November 24, 2011.
217 Case C-12/11, McDonagh v. Ryanair Ltd., 2011 0.J. (C 80) 14 (Mar. 12,
2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSer,.do?uri=OJ:
C:2011:080:0014:02:EN:HTML.
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cles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union?218
Clearly, the nature of the questions is not only intended to
invite the ECJ to further explicate its reasoning under Sturgeon
with respect to "extraordinary circumstances," but also to
prompt judicial comment-at least by way of opinion, if not
judgment-on the European Commission's insistence that air
carriers' obligations of care continued throughout the volcanic
ash events of 2010.219 On March 22, 2012, Advocate General
Bot delivered the opinion in McDonagh.220 The reasoning set
out therein indicates that while the EC Regulation excludes an
air carrier's liability for compensation in cases which embrace
the extraordinary circumstances exception, the liability for care
imposed by Article 5 (1) (b) is not likewise relieved. Accordingly,
the Advocate General opined that:
[T]he EU legislature wanted to bracket together under a sin-
gle notion-"extraordinary circumstances"-all circumstances
which are beyond the control of the air carrier, whatever the na-
ture of those circumstances or their gravity. I therefore consider
that there is no room for a category of events which go beyond
extraordinary circumstances, as proposed by Ryanair. An event
such as the eruption of the Eyjafjallaj6kull volcano thus certainly
constitutes, to my mind, an example of extraordinary circum-
stances for the purposes of Regulation No 261/2004, triggering
for the air carrier the attendant obligation of providing care for
passengers whose flights have been [canceled] owing to that
eruption.221
The Advocate General further pointed out that it was not pos-
sible to imply that the responsibility for care was excluded in
cases such as the Eyjafjallaj6kull volcanic ash on the wording of
the EC Regulation, as to do so would be "to create a separate
category of 'particularly extraordinary' events which would fully
release the air carrier from its obligation. 222 This comment
cannot be read without irony considering that one effect of the
Sturgeon decision was in fact the creation of an implied category
that allowed for the payment of compensation in circumstances
218 Id.
219 Information Note to the Commission: The Impact of the Volcanic Ash
Cloud Crisis on the Air Transport Industry, 2010 0J. (1915) 1, 24.
220 Case C-12/11, McDonagh v. Ryanair Ltd., 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
0012 (Mar. 22, 2012).
221 Id. para. 34.
222 Id. para. 35.
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not anticipated by the EC Regulation. Thus, it appears that the
ECJ, if it concurs with the Advocate General's reasoning, will
again be in effect, if not in word, contradicting itself.
The Advocate General did not consider that the third ques-
tion needed answering in light of the conclusions in relation to
the first two referred questions. As for the last two questions,
the Advocate General determined that Articles 5 and 9 of the
EC Regulation do not "imply any such limitation of the provi-
sion of care for passengers whose flights have been [canceled]
owing to extraordinary circumstances, 223 citing the text of Arti-
cle 9 which states that meals and refreshments are to be offered
free of charge "'in a reasonable relation to the waiting time.'
224
Controversially, the Advocate General cited the fact that Ryanair
introduced an "EU 261" levy on tickets, which is explicitly to
cover the costs incurred as a result of the Icelandic volcano air-
space closures, as a reason for concluding that the burden on air
carriers for complying with its care obligation was not dispropor-
tionate (as carriers may pass the cost on to passengers). It is
worth pointing out that no attention was given in the opinion as
to how this explicit recognition of the lack of a limitation on
damages in the EC Regulation conflicts with Article 29 of the
Montreal Convention (which, inter alia, limits air carrier liability
to the limits set out in the Convention).
The tone of the opinion is perhaps unsurprising but it is
hoped that (should the ECJ follow the opinion) air carriers and
their insurers will become more aware that the implications of
not financially preparing to deal with the costs of Article 5-style
care obligations could be unsettling, if not disastrous, should
other unexpected events like volcanic ash airspace closures
cause large-scale losses in the future. Put simply, the ECJ is not
sympathetic to the fact that air carriage is peculiarly sensitive to
events like volcanic ash and notes "the Court has ruled that
given in particular to the manner in which they operate, the
conditions governing their accessibility and the distribution of
their networks, different modes of transport are not inter-
changeable as regards the conditions of their use. 225
What is left for air carriers to do to defend themselves from
the kinds of claims that the EC Regulation allows, in disregard
2V3 Id. para. 50.
224 Id. para. 52.
225 Case C-344/04, Int'l Air Transp. Assoc. v. Dep't for Transp., 2006 E.C.R. I-
403, paras. 86, 96-97.
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of the principles agreed to internationally in the Montreal Con-
vention? It appears that air carriers may only protect their inter-
ests by defending the EC Regulation claims and prompting such
questions as those referred to above. If volcanic ash events or
other similarly destructive events happen again, forced compli-
ance with the EC Regulation could spell the end for many air
carriers, especially those with "low cost" financial models u. 2 11 It
appears that, barring an exceedingly negative review of the EC
Regulation in 2012-e.g., one that calls for it to be repealed-
air carriers have little choice but to press their interests through
the courts when they receive voluminous claims that push at the
boundaries of fact situations anticipated by the EC Regulation.
2. Pending Preliminary Questions Challenging the Compatibility of
Sturgeon with the Montreal Convention (1999), the IATA
Case, or Both
On December 13, 2010, in the case of Nelson v. Deutsche Luf-
thansa AG, a reference for a preliminary ruling on certain issues
was sent to the ECJ by the Amtsgericht K61n (Germany)
Court.2 27 The issues seek clarification of whether the kind of
compensation that may be claimed under Article 7 of the EC
Regulation falls within the meaning of "non-compensatory dam-
ages" as that term is used in the prohibition within Article 29 of
the Montreal Convention. 22' This question represents an at-
tempt to avoid the application of Article 7 of the EC Regulation
by characterizing it as a prohibited type of damages under the
Montreal Convention. The remaining questions follow in the
same vein.
Certainly, in the IATA Case, the Regulation has been charac-
terized as "particular action ... envisaged by the public authori-
ties to redress, in a standardised and immediate manner, the
damage that is constituted by the inconvenience that delay in
the carriage of passengers by air causes. "229
226 Bird & Bird has opined that, of the $1.7-$1.8 billion lost by airlines as a
result of volcanic ash that precipitated airspace closures in Europe in 2010, a
"substantial portion . . . will be attributable to the refunds and compensation
payable pursuant to EC regulation 261/04." Richard Venables & Chris Healy,
The Case for ReformingEC Regulation 261/2004, BIRD & BIRD (June 29, 2010), http:/
/www.twobirds.com/English/News/Articles/Pages/ECRegulation_2612004.
aspx (on file with authors).
227 Case C581/10, Nelson v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 2011 OJ. (C 72) 8, 8-9.
228 Id.
229 Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n v. Dep't for Transp., 2006 E.C.R. 1-00403, para. 45.
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This indicates that the ECJ considered the EC Regulation akin
to a "fine." However, this "fine" is paid to passengers rather
than appropriated by a governmental authority, so it has the
character of compensation, an affront to Article 19 of the Mon-
treal Convention.230 If the EC Regulation is not compensatory,
then it may be considered a penalty and would, thus, contradict
the second sentence of Article 29 of the Montreal Conven-
tion. 31 Even if the ECJ is right and the EC Regulation is in-
tended to provide supplementary means of redress to
compensation under Article 19, it violates the exclusivity princi-
ple contained in Article 29. It will be interesting to read the
ECJ's opinion on this confounding question.
The remaining two questions in Nelson further demonstrate
this predicament. The first of these asks "[w] hat is the relation-
ship" between the right to Sturgeon-based compensation and the
right to compensation set out in Article 19 of the Montreal Con-
vention, while the other asks how the ECJ reconciles its interpre-
tation underlying Sturgeon with the interpretative criterion it
applied in the IATA Case.232 This is clear evidence of the parties'
dissatisfaction with the reasoning in Sturgeon, which, as set out
above, seems to make new law rather than authoritatively inter-
pret the existing law.
On December 24, 2010, in the case of TUI Travel PLC v. Civil
Aviation Authority (TUI), a Reference for a preliminary ruling on
certain issues was sent to the ECJ by the High Court of Justice of
England and Wales, Queen's Bench Division (Administrative
Court).23 The issues, which the Advocate General Sharpston
clearly considered to be of sufficient importance to reopen oral
submissions, were squarely within the ambit of the ECJ's deci-
sion in Sturgeon and caught upon certain statements made in the
Advocate General's opinion in that case.234
In particular, this reference presents a challenge and request
for clarification on whether Sturgeon can be used as authority for
the treatment of certain delays as de facto cancellations, so as to
230 See Montreal Convention, supra note 32, art. 19.
231 See id., art. 29.
232 Nelson, 2011 OJ. (C72) at 8-9.
233 Case C-629/10, TUI Travel PLC v. Civil Aviation Auth., 2011 OJ. (C 89) 10,
10.
234 Id.; seejoined Cases C402/07 & C-432/07, Sturgeon v. Condor Flugdienst
GmbH, B6ck v. Air France SA, 2009 E.C.R. 1-10923, para. 26.
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permit compensation under Article 7 of the EC Regulation.235
Accordingly, the reference seeks to invalidate Articles 5-7 for
breach of the principle of equal treatment in Community law.236
It further seeks to invalidate Articles 5-7 for inconsistency with
the Montreal Convention and other breaches of Community law
principles-i.e., proportionality and legal certainty.23 7 Finally,
the reference seeks the ECJ's understanding of what effect, if
any, is to be given to the Sturgeon decision between its delivery in
2009 and the date of the court's ruling in TUI.238 In an unusual
move, an oral hearing was permitted, and the ECJ heard oral
submissions from eight interested parties23 19 on March 20,
2012.240 All but the EU Commission and Poland opposed the
kind of compensation anticipated by the Sturgeon case.241 A
good summary of the arguments advanced is provided in
242Kathryn Ward's memorandum of the submissions. An opin-
ion is expected by the Attorney General on May 15, 2012, with
judgment to follow shortly thereafter.243
Bfisch v. Ryanair Ltd., lodged on May 24, 2011, is another case
from Germany that is the subject of a reference for a prelimi-
nary ruling from the Amtsgericht Geldern Court.244 This partic-
ular reference, like Nelson, intimates the parties' concerns over
how the right to compensation under Article 7 of the EC Regu-
lation interacts with the operation of the Montreal Conven-
tion.24 5 Specifically, the concern is whether Sturgeon-based
compensation-i.e., long delay or de facto cancellation-will be
subject to the limits of liability for delays as set out in the Mon-
235 Sched. of Order at para. 3(a), TUI Travel PLC v. Civil Aviation Auth.,





239 (1) TUI Travel, British Airways, easyJet and IATA; (2) Lufthansa; (3) Ger-
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(8) EU Commission.
240 KATHRYN WARD, (1) TUI TRAVEL PLC, (2) BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC, (3) EASYJET




241 Id. at 4-5.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 5.
244 Case C-255/11, Bfisch v. Ryanair, Ltd., 2011 O.J. (C 226) 15, 15.
245 Id.
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treal Convention.246 Second, the reference asks whether the
ECJ will consider any damages paid in excess of that required to
compensate the passenger for the long delay as non-compensa-
tory and, thus, prohibited by Article 29 of the Montreal Conven-
tion. 24 7 This could perhaps be true, as damage amounts in
excess of that required for full compensation may be character-
ized as punitive or exemplary-categories of damages that also
fall outside the Montreal Convention proscription. The Ger-
man court also seeks to know whether such a situation precludes
a right to compensation altogether or if such a right only arises
for amounts of damages actually incurred in the event of
delays.248
A Dutch reference for a preliminary ruling comes from the
Rechtbank Breda Court and was lodged on June 27, 2011, in
Van de Ven v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N. V. 49 Again,
the court has been asked to decide whether Article 7 compensa-
tion is consistent with the exclusivity of both the remedies set
out in Article 29 of the Montreal Convention and the other limi-
tations of liability set out in the Montreal Convention.25 0 If this
question is answered in the negative, then the court has been
asked to decide whether there would be any limitations imposed
by an affirmative ECJ ruling that Article 7 compensation is
valid.251
From the tone of the questions being asked of the ECJ by the
various national courts and as argued strongly by airlines and
certain countries (e.g., Germany and the United Kingdom), it
would seem that, instead of seeking to advance the jurispru-
dence of the European courts regarding the EC Regulation, the
more pragmatic solution would be to invalidate the EC Regula-
tion and allow the situation of delay to default to the operation
of Articles 19 and 29 of the Montreal Convention, which have
adequately addressed all the questions now before the ECJ.
Under Article 19, all provable damages for delay may be recov-
ered up to a limit of 4,694 SDR.2 5 2 The judiciary should not
246 Id.; see Montreal Convention, supra note 32, arts. 22(1), 29.
247 Busch, 2011 0.J. at 15.
248 Id.
249 Case C-315/11, Van de Ven v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V.,
2011 O.J. (C 269) 27, 27-28.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 28.
2-2 Montreal Convention, supra note 32, art. 19; Press Release, Gov't of Hong
Kong, supra note 42.
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artificially construe delay by using legislation that only deals
with, ostensibly, cancellation. 25 Furthermore, there need not
be any artificiality in compensating delay by reference to fixed,
quasi-punitive payments that bear no resemblance to passen-
gers' actual losses.254 In short, the several questions before the
ECJ indicate the redundancy of regional legislation for compen-
sation for delay.
VI. RECONCILING EC REGULATION 261/2004 WITH
DELAY UNDER THE MONTREAL CONVENTION (1999)--A
BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?
As noted above, the principal criticism of the EC Regulation is
that it conflicts with the mechanism set up to deal with compen-
sation for delay in the Montreal Convention. But does the exis-
tence of the EC Regulation represent a breach of international
law?
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (Vienna
Convention) came about, inter alia, to maintain the achievement
of cooperation among nations and stated that "the principles of
free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule
are universally recognized." '255 As such, the rules codify several
aspects of customary international law that govern the interpre-
tation, application, and observance of treaties.256 In relation to
the EC Regulation, Articles 26 and 31 of the Vienna Convention
are invoked due to the conflicting nature of the subject matter
of the EC Regulation and Articles 19 and 29 of the Montreal
Convention.257
Article 29 of the Montreal Convention provides that compen-
sation shall only be recoverable under the terms of the Montreal
Convention.258 However, both the Montreal Convention and
the EC Regulation regulate delay.259 By providing a legislative
basis-other than that established by the Montreal Conven-
tion-for the recovery of damages occasioned by delay, the EC
Regulation can be considered a breach of Article 26 of the Vi-
enna Convention. The EC Regulation conflicts with Article 29
253 See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
254 SeeEC Regulation, supra note 115, art. 7; supra notes 187-90 and accompa-
nying text.
255 Vienna Convention, supra note 152, pmbl.
256 See id.
257 See id. arts. 26, 31; Montreal Convention, supra note 32, arts. 19, 29.
258 Montreal Convention, supra note 32, art. 29.
259 Id., art. 19; EC Regulation, supra note 115, arts. 1, 6.
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of the Montreal Convention in at least three ways because it pro-
vides for compensation outside the Montreal Convention that:
(1) is effectively unlimited-at least for instances of "care" where
no specific limit is provided-as opposed to the current
Montreal Convention Article 22(1) limit of 4,694 SDR 260 and
which, in relation to care, was recently explicitly recognized
by Advocate General Bot in McDonagh;
261
(2) does not offer air carriers the defenses regarding the care
obligation that are available to them in cases under the Mon-
treal Convention;26 2 and
(3) is inconsistent with the Montreal Convention in that the pas-
senger losses need not be proven to recover compensation,
as is implicit in Article 19 of the Montreal Convention.26 3
The "good faith" requirement of the Vienna Convention is
uncontroversial in international law. It is not a major logical
leap to propose that enactment of a conflicting and contrary
regulation similar in subject to a ratified uniform treaty provi-
sion is a sign that the performance of Article 29 of the Montreal
Convention has not been duly regarded.
Treaty law is binding on the institutions of the European
Community and on member states of the EU. In fact, under the
Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has international legal personality.
264
As the court in Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Secretary of State for
Energy & Climate Change (ETSJudgment) held:
Under Article 3(5) TEU, the European Union is to contribute to
the strict observance and the development of international law.
Consequently, when it adopts an act, it is bound to observe inter-
national law in its entirety, including customary international
law, which is binding upon the institutions of the European
Union.2 65
2- Compare EC Regulation, supra note 115, art. 9, with Montreal Convention,
supra note 32, art. 22(1), and Press Release, Gov't of Hong Kong, supra note 42.
261 Case C-12/11, McDonagh v. Ryanair Ltd., 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
0012, para. 50 (Mar. 22, 2012).
262 Compare EC Regulation, supra note 115, art. 6, with Montreal Convention,
supra note 32, art. 51.
263 Compare EC Regulation, supra note 115 (lacking any requirement of proof
of passenger losses), with Montreal Convention, supra note 32, art. 19.
264 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 OJ. (C 306) 1, 38.
265 Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Sec'y of State for Energy & Cli-
mate Change, 2011 E.C.R. 0, para. 101.
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In international law, internal law is no justification for a breach
of treaty obligations, 266 and, thus, the enactment of the EC Reg-
ulation is inconsistent with, if not a breach of, obligations that
the ECJ itself recognizes.
VII. REVIEW AND POTENTIAL REFORM OF EC
REGULATION 261/2004
Having contended that the EC Regulation represents an aber-
rant breach of several conventional international obligations,
the article now turns to the question of past and future review
and reform. As discussed below, the EC has reviewed the EC
Regulation. But, the regime itself must nevertheless be substan-
tially revised or repealed because, among other pragmatic rea-
sons, it is inconsistent with international law.
A. PRIOR REGULATORY REVIEW: 2007
A regulatory review was completed in February 2007, coinci-
dentally not long after the judgment was delivered in the IATA
Case.267 The review was mandated by the EC Regulation itself.26 s
The Commission asked Steer Davies Gleave (SDG) to conduct
an independent review of the EC Regulation (2007 Review).269
Other reviews have since complemented the 2007 Review and
the judicial examinations by the European courts in the IATA
Case and others. 27 0 SDG makes it clear that the 2007 Review has
been neither adopted nor approved by the EC, but, importantly,
it was a significant effort that included results obtained from "in-
depth discussions and consultation with stakeholders, including
air carriers, . . . data analysis, a survey of passengers' exper-
iences, and .. .an independent legal review.''271
The examination of the 2007 Review in this article is confined
to the legal review commissioned by SDG that appears as Sec-
266 Vienna Convention, supra note 152, art. 27.
267 See Case C-344/04, Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n v. Dept. for Transp., 2006 E.C.R.
1-00403.
268 EC Regulation, supra note 115, art. 17.
269 STEER DAVIES GLEAVE, REVIEW OF REGULATION 261/2004: FINAL REPORT
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 Review].
270 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil on the Application of Regulation 261/2004 Establishing Common Rules on Compensa-
tion and Assistance to Passengers in the Event of Denied Boarding and of Cancellation or
Long Delay of Flights, at 5, COM (2011) 174 final (Apr. 11, 2011); see also infra Part
VIII.
271 2007 Review, supra note 269, at 1 (emphasis added).
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tion 6 of the document.272 Perhaps due to the recency of the
IATA Case decision, the summary of the legal review occupies
only seven of the 157 pages in the document.273 One of the
recommendations of the 2007 Review was that another review
be conducted in two to three years.2 74 However, the principal
criticisms of the EC Regulation identified in the 2007 Review
were that elements of the EC Regulation required clarifica-
tion.2 7 5 Many of the clarifications point to ambiguity in the lan-
guage of the EC Regulation that foreshadows difficulties
inherent in applying the EC Regulation to compensating pas-
sengers for delays caused by events that factually cannot have
come about by any act or omission of the air carrier.276 Events
like airspace closures due to volcanic ash immediately come to
mind with respect to the determination of what exactly consti-
tutes an "extraordinary circumstance."
Furthermore, the determination of what "delay" means under
the EC Regulation was identified as an issue requiring clarifica-
tion.2 7 7 The lack of explanation following the 2007 Review has
spawned much case law that has recently determined that a "de-
lay" occurs even when an aircraft takes off at its scheduled time
and must return to the departure airport due to a problem.27
Many recommendations related to definitional problems
include:
" the overly inclusive definitions of "delay," "denied boarding,"
and "cancellation." For example, "denied boarding" includes
cases not only where there is "insufficient capacity due to
overbooking," but also where "the aircraft due to operate a
flight becomes unserviceable and the only alternative aircraft
is smaller so that not all passengers can be accommo-
dated";2 79
• ambiguity as to how the exception applies to a situation in
which Community carriers are absolved from providing assis-
272 See id. at 87-94.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 116.
275 Id. at 87.
276 For example, Sturgeon and Wallentin Hermann both identified the stunning
array of interpretations open to courts due to the ambiguity of certain provisions
in the EC Regulation. SeeJoined Cases C-402/07 & C-432/07, Sturgeon v. Con-
dor Flugdienst GmbH, B6ck v. Air France SA, 2009 E.C.R. 1-10923, paras. 1-3;
Case C-549/07, Wallentin-Herman v. Alitalia-Linee Italiane SpA, 2008 E.C.R. I-
11061, para. 1.
277 2007 Review, supra note 269, at 87.
278 Case C-83/10, Rodriguez v. Air France, SA, 2011 E.C.R. 0, para. 47.
279 2007 Review, supra note 269, at 87.
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tance when such assistance has already been given to passen-
gers departing from an airport in a non-EU state on a flight
into the EU;28 ° and
the scope of the term "extraordinary circumstances," espe-
cially as used in the examples provided in the Recitals of the
EC Regulation. 21 1
Given the recent delivery of the Opinion and ETSJudgment on
the extraterritorial validity of the EU ETS,28 2 one particular as-
pect of SDG's analysis warrants attention: the fact that the Com-
mission asked for an assessment of "whether the [EC]
Regulation should be applied to flights into the EU operated by
non-EU carriers. ' 2 3 The authors are not aware of any amend-
ments to the EC Regulation that purport to do this, but, given
the fact that the unilateral imposition of EU ETS legislation on
foreign air carriers was upheld by the ECJ, 28 4 the Commission's
interest in this scenario is cause for concern. The 2007 Review
identifies that an extension of the EC Regulation to flights into
the EU operated by non-EU carriers would present an example
of extraterritorial application of domestic law, which is a breach
of both the customary rule of sovereignty and Article 1 of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 (Chicago
Convention)2 1 5 and is, thus, unenforceable. 2 6 An analogous ar-
gument would hold true if the EC Regulation were likewise ex-
tended to include non-Community carriers' flights from non-EU
countries to points within the EU. But, in light of the ETSJudg-
ment, if such a law were ever promulgated, the decision would
likely provide ample support for application of yet another fi-
nancially and practically onerous law to foreign air carriers.
SDG noted that the allegation of extraterritorial application
might not be a foregone conclusion in all situations-e.g.,
where a ticket has been purchased in the EU.287 In such a case,
it has been held that the place the ticket was purchased permit-
280 Id. at 88.
281 Id. at 89.
282 Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Sec'y of State for Energy & Cli-
mate Change, 2011 E.C.R. 0.
283 2007 Review, supra note 269, at 93.
284 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 2011 E.C.R. at paras. 71, 158 (holding that the ETS
was not an extraterritorial application of EU law and that the EU was not bound
by the Convention on International Civil Aviation).
285 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature, Dec. 7,
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
286 2007 Review, supra note 269, at 93-94.
287 Id. at 94 (citing CAB v. Lufthansa, AG, 591 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
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ted extraterritorial application of U.S. laws regulating overbook-
ing and denied boarding.2 8
Finally, the 2007 Review noted that, despite the decision of
the ECJ in the IATA Case, the question of whether the EC Regu-
lation was consistent with the Montreal Convention had not
been settled, except internally within the EU. 289 It was possible
for one or more non-EU states to bring an action in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice with respect to potential breaches of the
Montreal Convention. 290
The review concluded that the two principal problems with
the EC Regulation were that there was "ineffective enforcement
in some Member States" and that "the text of the Regulation is
unclear in many areas. ' 29 1 Interestingly, the 2007 Review made
several recommendations that have not been implemented, po-
tentially due to a prevailing view at the time of the 2007 Review
that it would not be appropriate to change the EC Regulation
when it had only been operational for approximately eighteen
months.292 However, it was suggested by many of the inter-
viewed stakeholders that "the only way to resolve the issues that
have arisen with the Regulation was an amended Regulation." '293
B. NON REGULATORY AND PARALLEL EVENTS THAT SHOULD
INFORM THE NEXT REVIEW
1. Volcanic Ash in Europe and Forced Airline Compliance with EC
Regulation 261/2004
The volcanic ash events of April 2010 caused a heavy opera-
tional and financial burden for air carriers all over the world.
The IATA has estimated that air carriers suffered some $1.7 bil-
lion in lost revenue worldwide during the first six days after the
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id. It should also be noted that further dispute resolution mechanisms ex-
ist. For example, binding arbitration may be initiated through ICAO pursuant to
Chapter XVIII of the Chicago Convention. Furthermore, while less likely to be of
utility in such a politically charged regionally based dispute, it must not be forgot-
ten that states may negotiate or otherwise further their arguments and resolu-
tions of such disputes bilaterally or multilaterally. Similarly, other avenues may
be explored. For example, it would not be out of the question for the United
States to claim that the EC Regulation breaches clauses in the U.S.-EU Open
Skies Agreement and to resolve the dispute through the machinery of the Agree-
ment (Article 19 - Arbitration) against one of the EU Member State parties.
291 Id. at 95.
292 Id. at 97.
293 Id.
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initial eruption alone. 29 4 The costs to tour operators and other
areas of the tourism industry likewise suffered.295 To this day,
the reasons for the airspace "closures" remain controversial.29 6
However, with the assistance of ICAO guidance and contingency
plans that promoted a risk-averse approach to aircraft operation
in areas of known or forecasted volcanic ash contamination,
safety-the primary goal of all aviation stakeholders around the
world-was maintained.
29 7
In an Information Note from the European Commission
dated April 27, 2010, during the early days of recovery of normal
air traffic patterns in Europe, Siim Kallas, Joaquin Almunia, and
Olli Rehn recognized that the flight restrictions on travel within
the EU created a "very difficult situation for passengers who had
suddenly to [sic] face cancellations of flights due to extraordi-
nary circumstances. ' 29 8 Despite the difficult times and these
well-placed intentions, such compassion for passengers more
than completely displaced any compassion for air carriers who
remained liable for payments and other remedies under the EC
Regulation. 29 As stated in the Information Note, "The Commis-
sion considers that these regulations remain fully applicable
during these testing times for passengers and the industry alike.
The benefits of EU rules for passengers can be precisely appreci-
ated in such exceptional circumstances. "300
The EC did note that, in the case of flight cancellations, com-
pensation would not be due because "the circumstances were
clearly extraordinary. 30 1 Notwithstanding that concession, the
impact of the EC Regulation was a financial impost that should
294 IATA Economic Briefing: The Impact of Eyjafjallajokull's Volcanic Ash
Plume, INT'L AIR TRANSP. ASS'N (May 2010), http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/
Documents/economics/Volcanic-Ash-Plume-May2OlO.pdf.
295 EU Says Volcanic Ash Costs Tourism Industiy 1 Billion Euros, CHINA DAILY (Apr.
29, 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-04/29/content_9788370.
htm.
296 Mike Swain, Closure of Airspace Because of Volcanic Ash Cloud 'Was Justified,'
DAILY MIRROR (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/closure-
of-airspace-because-of-volcanic-ash-124822.
297 For a summary of the ICAO guidance in place at the time of the ash crisis
and an examination of the initial attitudes toward amending state and operator
reactions to airborne volcanic ash, see Joseph C. Wheeler, ICAO Guidance on Vol-
canic Ash: From Risk Aversion to Risk Management, 36 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 219
(2011).
298 Information Note to the Commission, supra note 219, at para. 23.
299 Id. at para. 24.
300 Id.
301 Id.
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not have fallen on the shoulders of the airline industry. The
care and assistance required and provided by airlines was of a
scale never seen since the implementation of the EC Regulation.
The EC stressed that "uniform application throughout the
EU '30 2 was required and recommended that:
[mlember states adopt administrative acts listing all [canceled]
and long-delayed flights resulting from the airspace closure, and
fixing a timeline for passengers on those flights to provide proof
to the operating air carrier of their expenses according to the
regulation, which would be duly reimbursed by the carrier within
the fixed timeline. °3
The EC did recognize that the situation was out of airlines' con-
trol, but its insistence on the application of the EC Regulation to
provide care, even during such a unique time, was both unex-
pected and unnecessary.
As previously discussed, the Montreal Convention provides a
uniform and assessable means by which individual passenger
losses can be compensated. The availability of an instant "quick
fix" for delayed passengers during the ash crisis via the EC Regu-
lation may have had its practical usefulness (and, indeed, neces-
sity), but that being the case, providing this kind of assistance
should have been within the mandate of national authorities, a
regional or other supra-national insurance fund, or private
travel insurance. The fact that air carriers were forced to be the
"deep pockets" in a situation over which they had negligible
control indicates that the air passenger protection policy under-
lying the EC Regulation, while based on an admirable desire to
advance passenger rights, was foundationally deficient. It arbi-
trarily placed this risk with air carriers instead of considering
where the economic risk of paying compensation should most
reasonably lie. As Professor Schubert notes, "The European epi-
sode of volcanic ash has proved the legitimacy of the airlines'
position."304
An example of the confusion that the volcanic ash crisis
caused the NEBs was demonstrated by the EC's release of infor-
mal guidelines-a "non paper"-that aimed to assist NEBs in
fixing the common application of the EC Regulation under the
"exceptional circumstances directly linked to the eruption of
302 Id.
303 Id. at para. 25.
304 Francis P. Schubert, Air Navigation and Volcanic Ash Contamination: A Legal
Analysis, 36 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 169, 217 (2011).
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the volcano in Iceland.13 5 This document, variously expressed
to be non-binding and not to set any precedent, illustrates that
the EC Regulation is not fit for its task, especially after the deci-
sion of the ECJ in Sturgeon.
The discussion above demonstrates that, even if one concedes
that passenger rights policies demand a "quick fix" for delayed
passengers outside of the Montreal Convention (assuming such
a scheme would be lawful under international law, which is not
here conceded), a more thorough examination should never-
theless be made of potential sources of the funds for compensa-
tion and care in instances of force majeure. It has been widely
suggested that the EC Regulation requires reform. °6 Indeed,
some commentators have gone so far as to say that the EC Regu-
lation should "be amended to include exemptions in the event
of exceptional circumstances such as volcanic eruptions that
prevent the airlines from operating."3 °7
Extending this thinking one step further, it would be benefi-
cial if an approach was followed similar to that which was re-
cently taken by ICAO states in the 2009 Convention on
Compensation for Damage to Third Parties, Resulting from Acts
of Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft (Unlawful Interfer-
ence Convention)-specifically, the establishment of an Inter-
national Civil Aviation Compensation Fund.30 8 This could be
accomplished either in a protocol to the Montreal Convention
or, at least in the interim, inclusion in the EC Regulation follow-
ing the impending comprehensive review. The creation of such
a fund under the auspices of the ICAO would mark a real return
to the foundational motivations for unifying civil aviation regula-
tion internationally.3 0 9
305 Proposed Informal Guidelines on the Application of Some Articles of (EC) Regulation
261/2004 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Aug. 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/transport/
passengers/air/doc/201 1_ash-cloud-crisis-guidelines-for-interpretation.pdf.
306 Eg., Schubert, supra note 304, at 213-17.
307 Id.
308 Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Convention on Compensation for Damage to
Third Parties, Resulting from Acts of Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft, at 5-11,
DCCD Doc. 43 (May 2, 2009) [hereinafter Unlawful Interference Convention].
309 The Preamble to the Chicago Convention provides:
WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation
can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understand-
ing among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can
become a threat to the general security; and
WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that co-
operation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of
the world depends;
AIR CARRIER LIABILITY FOR DELA Y
The volcanic ash events have shown that a comprehensive
overhaul of the EC Regulation and the policies associated with
consumer protection, in the context of the existing conven-
tional framework, is necessary. Doing nothing would lead to
further absurdities during extraordinary circumstances, whether
natural or unnatural, and would be as debilitating to passengers
and the airline industry as terrorist attacks on aviation
infrastructure.
Air carriers, who must comply with an international private
law regime that "covers the field" of compensation to passengers
who suffer loss as a result of air carrier delays, simply and
pragmatically should not be subjected to a parallel regional leg-
islative mechanism that places upon them the burden of paying
for the costs of delays and cancellations brought about by every
act of nature, including acts, such as volcanic ash, that are not
only out of their own control, but out of the control of every
aviation-related entity in the world.3 10 This arbitrary imposition
on air carriers takes passenger protection too far.
2. Lessons that May Be Learned from the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU Directive 2008/101/EC) Challenge Litigation
We note at the outset that the legislation creating the EU ETS
is unlike the EC Regulation in that the latter is much more
pointedly intended to capture air carriers-including, from Jan-
uary 1, 2012, foreign air carriers-that specifically operate par-
ticular flights in and out of the EU.31' The EC Regulation
applies to outbound cases of "long delays" for foreign air carri-
ers, but only Community carriers for inbound legs.31 2 However,
the international aviation community's forceful reaction to the
THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on cer-
tain principles and arrangements in order that international civil
aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that
international air transport services may be established on the basis
of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically.
Chicago Convention, supra note 285, pmbl.
"I" As Professor Schubert points out, "[t]he main flaw of the European legisla-
tion is that it burdens airlines with the obligation to compensate passengers for
damages arising from events on which they have absolutely no control, such as
weather conditions or even social disputes affecting the ATC system." Schubert,
supra note 304, at 217.
311 Compare Council Directive 2008/101/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 008) 3, 3 (EC)
("amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community"),
with EC Regulation, supra note 115, art. 3(1).
312 EC Regulation, supra note 115, art. 3(1).
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unilateral imposition of the EU ETS on foreign carriers is indic-
ative of a widely held belief that the EU lacks the motivation to
remain in harmony with the uniform air carriage conventional
framework-the motivation that caused all twenty-seven mem-
ber states to ratify the Montreal Convention.
Criticisms similar to those in this article and in its predeces-
sors of the reasoning of the ECJ in the IATA Case were prompted
by the delivery of the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott on
October 6, 2011, in relation to the IATA (and other organiza-
tions') challenge to the validity of the EU ETS (ETS Case).313
Principally, the unsurprising refrain was that the reasoning in
the Opinion did not reflect the commonly held and cogent view
on the compatibility of certain aspects of regional or domestic
legislation within the prevailing civil air law context 14 The ETS
Judgment does not significantly depart from the ETS Case.
The Opinion in the ETS Case is controversial in its application
of international legal principles with respect to standing, extra-
territorial application of domestic law, the generally understood
reservation to the ICAO of competence to facilitate laws with
respect to carbon emissions by the Kyoto Protocol of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 15 and
principles of proportionality in the construction of the "fair and
equal opportunity" clause in the European Union-United States
Open Skies Agreement (Open Skies Agreement).3 1 6 The Opin-
ion presented the narrow view that, because the EU ETS is a
market-based measure with an ostensible purpose of environ-
mental and climate protections, it does not fall within the prohi-
bition against "fees, dues or other charges" as that term is used
in the Chicago Convention and Open Skies Agreement.3 17 Such
a view is surprising given the existence of substantive European
case law that analogously connects domestic financial imposts
on civil aviation emissions with impermissible imposts on fuel
under supra-national EU regulations analogous to the prohibi-
tions within the Open Skies Agreement and Chicago Conven-
313 Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Sec'y of State for Energy & Cli-
mate Change, 2011 E.C.R. 0 (Opinion of Advocate Gen. Kokott) [hereinafter
ETS case].
314 Robert Wall & Jens Flottau, EU Emissions Trading Battle Intensifies, AVIATION
WK. (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/jsp-includes/article
Print.jsp?headLine=EU %20Emissions%2OTrading%2OBattle%201ntensifies&
storyID=news/awst/2011/10/10/AW 10_10_201Lp28-378681.xml.
315 Council Decision 2002/358/CE, ann. III, 2002 O.J. (L 130) 4, 20.
316 Air Transport Agreement, 2007 OJ. (L 134) 4, 6 (EU).
317 ETS case, 2011 E.C.R. at paras. 215-221.
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tion.3 1 However, the court distinguished Braathens by holding
that it involved "a direct and inseverable link between fuel con-
sumption and the polluting substances" emitted by aircraft. 19 It
did not likewise see the same link in the EU ETS, which, accord-
ing to the Advocate General, does not allow a direct inference to
be drawn between fuel consumption, per se, and greenhouse
gases emitted in the course of a particular flight, citing the cal-
culation methodology used in the directive.32 If anything, this
is a creative construction that relies heavily on the definition
within the directive; however, the refusal to link aviation fuel
with greenhouse gas emissions in this way amounts to an appeal
to a shaky technicality.
While there is merit to some of the conclusions reached by
the court, the construction of the international legal instru-
ments advanced therein is untenable. As with the IATA Case, the
court has preferred a narrow, preferential construction of the
instruments that seems out of line with the objective purpose of
those instruments-the promotion of uniformity and multilater-
alism rather than singularity and unilateralism. 2' Thus, the rea-
soning does not support a purposive approach and more likely
provides another example of what has been variously described
as the ECJ's "reputation for generously upholding aviation regu-
lations promulgated by the ever-growing and power-thirsty Brus-
318 See generally Case C-346/97, Braathens Sverige AB v. Riksskatteverket, 1999
E.C.R. 1-3419 (holding that the supra-national exemption of mineral oils and fuel
from taxes was breached by a Swedish national law taxing domestic aviation emis-
sions). This situation is analogous to the relationship between Article 24 of the
Chicago Convention, which prohibits "customs duty, inspection fees or similar
national or local duties and charges" on, inter alia, fuel and lubricating oils, Chi-
cago Convention, supra note 285, art. 24, and ICAO Doc. 8632, which states: "the
expression 'customs and other duties' shall include import, export, excise, sales,
consumption and internal duties and taxes of all kinds levied upon the fuel, lubri-
cants and other consumable technical supplies." Int'l Civil Aviation Org.
[ICAO], ICAO's Policies on Taxation in the Field of International Air Transport, para.
1 (d), ICAO Doc. 8632-C/968 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added), available at http:/
/www.icao.int/publications/Documents/8632-consen.pdf. Legislating for the
payment of charges calculated by distance of flight flown is akin to charging for
the consumption of the fuel used for that journey.
319 ETS case, 2011 E.C.R. at para. 233.
320 "Actual fuel consumption is calculated by subtracting from the amount of
fuel contained in aircraft tanks once fuel uplift for the flight is complete the
amount of fuel contained in aircraft tanks once fuel uplift for the subsequent
flight is complete, and adding the fuel uplift for that subsequent flight." ETS case,
2011, E.C.R. at para. 230, n. 179.
321 This can be considered a violation of the rule in Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention. Vienna Convention, supra note 152, art. 26.
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sels bureaucracy, '3 22 and "[r]ather than testing EU air law
against international air law, it seems that the Court applies that
test-if at all-the other way around.132 3
The distancing of the EU from international uniformity in
public international and private international air law was re-
cently the stimulus for a provocative political move by the
United States. The United States proposed legislation in July
2011 that, if passed, will make it unlawful for U.S. air carriers to
participate in the EU ETS once it is applied to foreign air carri-
ers.3 24 The aptly titled European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011325 has had strong bipartisan
support thus far and passed through the House of Representa-
tives on October 24, 2011.326
One interpretation of the import of the bill is that the U.S.
government will, in the short term, negotiate for an exemption
or other such concession from the EU and, perhaps, indemnify
U.S. air carriers from any losses or penalties they sustain as a
result of being the physical agents of the U.S. government.
However, it also does not seem out of the question that the
United States might express its annoyance by revoking certain
air access rights from EU carriers if the EU should enforce its
ban on foreign carriers for failing to comply with its ETS. This
has been the course of several previous international aviation
disputes.32 v
In a separate, public criticism on September 30, 2011, the
United States signed a non-binding joint declaration with sev-
eral nations that secured public support for its opposition to the
unilateral imposition of the EU ETS.328 Twenty-six ICAO states
322 Dempsey & Johansson, supra note 139, at 219.
323 Arnold & Mendes de Leon, supra note 139, at 93.
324 H.R. Doc. No. 112-2594, pt. 3, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.govtrack.
us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=Hi 12-2594.
325 Id., pt. 1, at 1.
326 See Bill Summary & Status - 112th Congress (2011-2012) - H.R.2594 - All
Information, THOMAS (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS), http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?d112:HR02594:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
327 See Paul B. Larsen, Arbitration of the United States-France Air Traffic Rights Dis-
pute, 30J. AIR L. & CoM. 231, 232 (1964). In fact international relations can sour
for decades following aviation disputes. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Competition in the
Air: European Union Regulation of Commercial Aviation, 66 J. AIR L. & CoM. 979,
1031-32 (2001).
328 See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Inclusion of International Civil Aviation in
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and Its Impact, para. 1.6,
ICAO Doc. C-WP/13790 (Oct. 17, 2011), available at http://www.ainalerts.com/
ainalerts/alertimages/ICAO.pdf.
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adopted the declaration on November 2, 2011, in Montreal. 29
These moves indicate that if measures like the EC Regulation
and the EU ETS are not quelled by public opinion or alterna-
tively, do not form the subject of new international conventions
that amend the Montreal Convention and the Chicago Conven-
tion, the object of uniformity will be all but a distant memory for
international air law.
VIII. IMPENDING REGULATORY REVIEW PLUS PENDING
CASES-THE PERFECT STORM FOR CHANGE?
The plethora of cases questioning and extending the interpre-
tation of the ambiguous terms within the EC Regulation show
that the decision not to amend the EC Regulation following the
2007 Review was perhaps, in hindsight, short-sighted. Certainly
the inability to point to any statistical reduction in air carrier
delays as a result of the imposition of the EC Regulation would
suggest that the legislation is not working."" A table found in
the EC's own working papers is worth reproducing here to sub-
stantiate this point:3
329 Bill Carey, ICAO Joins Airlines, Nations in Opposing Emissions Trading Scheme,
AINONLINE (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.ainonline.com/?q=aviation-news/ain-air-
transport-perspective/2011-11-07/icao-joins-airlines-nations-opposing-emissions-
trading-scheme.
3) See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil on the Operation and the Results of Regulation (EC) 261/2004 Establishing Common
Rules on Compensation and Assistance to Passengers in the Event of Denied Boarding and
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Proportion of total flights departing from EU airports that experienced long
delays at departure, 2006-2009
1,6
1,4
m Delay > 2 hours
" 0,8 Delay > 3 hours





2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Other facts and events outlined above would suggest that the
EC Regulation is not just failing, it is also imposing an economic
burden on air carriers incongruous with the industry's natural
and reasonable area of responsibility: air carriage. It intrudes in
other areas as well, such as economic risk-shifting for passengers
and social control that are within the realms of insurance and
government respectively, not air carriers.
Importantly, the EC has again resolved to assess the imple-
mentation of the EC Regulation. In a communication dated
April 11, 2011, the EC Vice President Sim Kallas provided an
assessment of the first six years of the application of the EC Reg-
ulation and announced that there would be "an impact assess-
ment and public consultation with a view to the Commission
adopting proposals for a revision of Regulation 261 on Air Pas-
senger Rights in 2012.11112 Although this assessment is a short
document, it instills hope in air law purists because it accepts
'32 Press Release, European Comm'n, Passenger Rights - Main Findings and
Next Steps (Apr. 11, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=MEMO/ / 232&format-HTMI&aged=O&language. Pub-
lic consultation for this review opened on December 19, 2011, and will close on
March 11, 2012. The review is being conducted by SDG, and details can be
viewed at http://ec.europa.eu/transportpassengersiconsultations/2012-03-11-
apr en.htm.
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that some of the difficulties identified in this and preceding aca-
demic commentary will be addressed or neutralized."'
One principal area identified for revision or reform is the
"structural limits of the [EC] Regulation, which have been
tested under the magnified scale of the [volcanic ash] crisis." 3 4
As a result, there is likely to be a shift on the effectively unlim-
ited liability of air carriers with respect to the right to care under
circumstances of natural disaster. The EC wisely announced
there would likely be a clarification of the way in which such
risks are properly shared and financed so that "no excessive bur-
den is placed on the aviation industry whilst also ensuring that
citizens do not bear the financial cost and inconvenience of nat-
ural catastrophes alone.3 35 Also, while carefully sidestepping
the actual form and substance of legislative amendment to the
EC Regulation, the EC acknowledged that several aspects of the
EC Regulation had been criticized: (1) its complexity; (2) lack
of limit on liability on provision of care in extraordinary circum-
stances beyond the carriers' control; (3) inadequate mecha-
nisms to ensure recovery of costs by air carriers against
responsible third parties; (4) the definition of "extraordinary
circumstances" within and outside of the carriers' control; and
(5) "lack of uniform interpretation and enforcement." '336
This aspect of uniform interpretation is the most relevant
from a legal analysis perspective. The EC implicitly endorsed
the decisions in Wallentin-Hermann and Sturgeon and noted that
the approach therein-to interpret provisions conferring rights
on air passengers broadly-was in line with the political objec-
tives of the EC Regulation-i.e., to reduce inconvenience for
passengers and to offer reasonable re-routing.33 7 Accordingly,
given that the EC agrees that "the ECJ has played a key role in
clarifying some of the most controversial points," there is likely
to be little, if any, change to Article 13 of the EC Regulation-
the right of redress permitting recovery of costs of compliance
with the EC Regulation from other at fault parties.3 Such an
333 See id.
334 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on the Application of Regulation 261/2004 Establishing Common Rules on Compensation
and Assistance to Passengers in the Event of Denied Boarding and of Cancellation or Long
Delay of Flights, at 4, COM (2011) 174 final (Apr. 11, 2011), available at http://ec.
europa.eu/transport/passengers/doc/com_2011_174_communication-en.pdf.
335 Id.
336 Id. at 5.
337 Id. at 7.
338 Id. at 8.
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approach remains an inept method of handling passenger rights
because the simple fact that air carriers are involved in and
sometimes cause delays is no reason to impose on air carriers
the burden of exercising a regional governmental policy that
has restorative social control features.
Recently, it has been suggested by Harold Caplan that a new
regulation should be founded on the basis of explicating the
rights and obligations of passengers and air carriers alike in the
contract of carriage. 3 9 It was proposed that this would ensure
practical cooperation between the various actors and service
providers that together determine whether flights would oper-
ate with delays. 40 This approach has an advantage in that, as
Caplan contends, it would provide a "basic Code of Conduct to
guide national courts when deciding whether the carrier may be
properly exonerated as permitted by article 19 of the Montreal
Convention. 13 4 1 Accordingly, the proposed outline of a poten-
tial new regulation would include elements that set out condi-
tions for passengers, requirements of cooperation for other
"actors and services," a requirement that carriers keep passen-
gers informed at all stages of a delay, and an outline of the du-
ties of states to supervise the regulation. 342 It was also suggested
that a procedural manual be adopted for major airports to effect
the necessary cooperation. 43
There is some merit in seeking the closer cooperation dis-
cussed in Caplan's proposed method of regulation, but such a
manual could create even more fertile ground for ambiguity,
judicial creativity, and inconsistency than the EC Regulation has
already spawned. If a regional European regulation is to remain
at all, it should be simplified, minimized, and made the subject
of supra-national control or repealed altogether to allow the
mechanisms of the Montreal Convention to do what they were
designed to do.
Assuming that the Montreal Convention and the EC Regula-
tion can both stand together, the passenger protection policies
of the EU would be best addressed by regulation of the air car-
rier by the state or a supra-national body that would require the
339 Harold Caplan, Fulfilling the Contract of Carriage: How a New European Regula-
tion Could Help Airlines and Their Passengers, 36 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 515, 523
(2011).
340 Id. at 524.
341 Id.
342 Id. at 524-25.
343 Id. at 525.
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air carriers to comply with the Montreal Convention or pay pen-
alties to the state, or to a fund from which passengers can access
assistance in times of need, rather than imposing the adminis-
trative burden of payments on air carriers that they must later
recover from other "at fault" parties.3 44 One would think that
the coordination of twenty-seven diverse nations' compliance
with such a regulation would immediately call for such simplifi-
cation, but this has not been the case to date with the EC
Regulation. 4
As the comments in the April 11, 2011 Communication are
limited regarding the higher level concerns expressed in this ar-
ticle regarding the compatibility of the EC Regulation and the
Montreal Convention-it merely approves the IATA Case-the
pessimistic outlook is that the EC is unlikely to use the review for
anything more than refinement of the existing regime rather
than using the opportunity to review the EC Regulation ab initio.
This is so despite the mounting case law of questions referred to
the ECJ inquiring as to the compatibility of the EC Regulation
with other international agreements and the sharp increase in
academic criticism of the EC Regulation, whether by way of cit-
ing the volcanic ash crisis as a strong impetus for reform, as dis-
cussed herein and echoed by Professor Schubert, 46 or
suggesting how a particular new approach to such regulations
could help airlines and their passengers navigate their contract
of carriage, as recommended by Caplan. 347 Accordingly, the EC
Regulation will likely continue to flout the otherwise agreed uni-
formity and exclusivity standard that has prevailed rather suc-
cessfully, in one way or another, since 1929.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Montreal Diplomatic Conference in 1999 was a success
because it literally adopted a new "Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air. '"3 48 The
key theme of the Montreal Convention was "uniformity." The
Montreal Convention modernized the Warsaw Convention and
its instruments and became a new single convention. As the
number of states that ratified the Montreal Convention has in-
34 See Schubert, supra note 304, at 217.
345 See id.
346 Id.
347 Caplan, supra note 339, at 523.
348 See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 32.
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creased, it has come to significantly minimize complexity caused
by the patchwork of several parallel regulations from both inside
and outside of ICAO states.
Article 19 of the Montreal Convention properly regulates de-
lay. The wording of Article 19 followed that of Articles 19 and
20 of the Warsaw Convention without significant changes. Since
neither the Warsaw Convention nor the Montreal Convention
provides a definition of delay or states what constitutes compen-
sable delay, these determinations must be made by national
courts. The generally accepted rule when national courts deter-
mine compensable damage is to assess whether the air carrier
took necessary measures that could reasonably be required to
avoid the damage in each step subsequent to finding the cause
of delay. If, at any point, the court believes the air carrier failed
to take the necessary measures to avoid the damage, the court
will hold the air carrier liable for the damage. However, if an air
carrier proves that it took the necessary measures to avoid the
damage, it will not be liable.
There are surely certain types of damage that the Montreal
Convention does not cover. Examples of those are denied
boarding and cancellation. They can be considered to amount
to non-performance of the contract of carriage-a matter not
regulated by the Warsaw System and open to the application of
any specific national legislation. In contrast, delay is clearly reg-
ulated by the Montreal Convention, and, therefore, any legisla-
tion regulating international carrier delay that aims to
supersede or contradict the conventional regime should be re-
considered pursuant to the exclusive remedies in the Montreal
Convention.
To back away from the path down which the ECJ is leading
international air law-a path where uniformity is giving way to
ambiguity, complexity, and redundancy in regional legislation
and jurisprudence-the ECJ must ensure its passenger-protec-
tion legislation complements, rather than conflicts with, the Mon-
treal Convention system. Passenger protections can be
advanced without doing so at the cost of international uniform-
ity and comity.349 Reviews of the EC Regulation have identified
that one of the consequential aims of the EC Regulation-re-
ducing delays for passengers-has not been achieved, and it
349 See Dempsey &Johansson, supra note 139, at 224.
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may not be possible through regulation alone. 5 ' Thus, surely it
is time to consider how decisive changes to the existing non-
punitive, though quasi-compensatory, system of the EC Regula-
tion may be effected to ensure air carriers are incentivized to fly
regularly and on time.
At the same time, any changes to the EC Regulation should
ensure that passengers do not experience windfalls for the mere
fortuity of holding a ticket at the time an inevitable delay occurs,
particularly if such delays do not financially impact them. Alter-
natively, if the EC Regulation must survive, detailed considera-
tion should be given to the creation of an International Civil
Aviation Compensation Fund to ensure that force majeure events,
such as the volcanic ash airspace closures of 2010, do not bring
with them the ability to financially incapacitate air carriers.
350 For example, the European Consumer Centre Network (ECC-Net) re-
ported that "in 2010, the ECC-Net handled 71,292 cases, of which 44,000 were
complaints. Approximately 33% of all recorded complaints were in the area of
transport and of those 57% concerned air passenger rights. Of those only 31%
could be resolved in an amicable manner, but where they were resolved consum-
ers received on average approximately C 509. In comparison to 2009, 2010 wit-
nessed an increase of 27% in the total number of complaints received by the
ECC-Net. Importantly, air passenger rights (APR) complaints increased by 59%
on the previous year. This indicates the impact the volcanic ash crisis had on the
number of complaints received in 2010." Clearly, EC 261/2004 is not built for
task. See European Consumer Centre Network [ECC-Net], ECC-Net Air Passenger
Rights Report 2011-In the Aftermath of the 'Volcanic Ash Crisis, at 4 (Oct. 2011),
available at http://www.euroconsumatori.org/download/16953v16953d69725.
pdf.
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